Saturday, November 18, 2017

The Ethics and Morals of Ted Bernstein Boca Raton Florida of Life Cycle Financial Planners.

The Truth About Ted Bernstein Boca Raton Florida of Life Cycle Financial Planners.

Folks, Read the TRUTH for Yourself. 

Don't TRUST anyone with what is TRUE for you. DO your own Homework, your own Due Diligence and Trust Yourself knowing you have done your homework.

Ted Bernstein Boca Raton Florida of Life Cycle Financial Planners claims to be able to do right by your FAMILY and to protect YOUR WEALTH. However, that is simply not True as I See It.

Read all of this blog, don't believe me, Believe YOURSELF. Read the documents, see what Ted Bernstein is involved in, understand what is happening in South Florida Courts and what probate courts and attorneys connected to them are really doing.

Check out the Illinois Federal Case on this blog. 2 million paid by Heritage Life Insurance / Jackson Life Insurance and NO POLICY

The Judges and Attorneys, Insurance Brokers, Title Companies, Brokers involved in the Simon Bernstein Estate Case, many have admitted or been caught with wrong doing, some fraud and forgery as you will see in documents.

I can sit here all day and call names and blather about whatever I want, who cares what I "think" or what I "believe". Read the documents for yourself and decide if Ted Bernstein  Boca Raton Florida of Life Cycle Financial Planners

I, Crystal Cox, have no need for YOU, the Reader to Believe me or NOT. My blogs are to protect the public at large. I have been reporting on what I deem as Corruption for 17 years now. Believe Me, don't believe me. I sincerely do not care.

What I do care about is that you know what is really going on in the courts, in your real estate transactions, in probate and estate cases, in insurance policies issued for 2 million WITH NO POLICY, in millions paid out with NO TRUST. I want YOU, the reader to educate yourself so that NONE of what is on this blog happens to you or those you love. Knowledge is Power.

Do NOT be a VICTIM of the Florida Court System, the Florida Probate Courts, Florida's Predatory Guardianship Racket or Florida Estate Courts.

Pam Simon of STP Enterprises, Pamela B. Simon. Arbitrage Life Payment System A.L.P.S and Ted Bernstein Boca Raton Florida of Life Cycle Financial Planners have a clear record of Pattern and Practice as far as I see it. Do your Homework on who was REALLY disinherited and what is REALLY going on with these cases and connected INVISIBLE Insurance Policies paying MILLIONS and Non-Existing Trusts.

Research Links

Ted Bernstein Boca Raton Florida Deposition

Ted Bernstein Court Files
Index of /Simon and Shirley Estate/ted court files

Click the Document Below and Save the Link as I will be adding research information for you to DO YOUR OWN DUE DILIGENCE for YOURSELF.  The LINK below is an ongoing document of which I will add research links for you to learn more.


For More on the Florida Probate Case, Florida Predatory Guardian Case, Florida Fraud and Forgery Case, Palm County Probate Courts and the Estate Case involving Ted Bernstein Boca Raton Florida of Life Cycle Financial Planners, Click Below.

Thursday, November 9, 2017

The tactics of the Gang Stalking attorneys who work with Marc Randazza and I allege some judges in the past are just as evil as what we are hearing about Harvey Weinstein and worse. Many of these targeted whistleblowers are harassed and shamed into suicide. Marc Randazza is NOT above the law nor is ANY attorney, Godaddy insider, Google insider, Court Clerk, or ANYONE else who helped Randazza to silence Victims.

Marc Randazza, Randazza Legal Group and their conspirators are CONSTANTLY active in suppressing Journalism.  They use their power and position as officers of the court to intimidate, threaten, bully, and shut down those who expose the Porn Industry secrets, expose human trafficking, EXPOSE predators, and EXPOSE the attorneys who protect them. 

Marc Randazza, Ron Green and Randazza Legal Group sidesteps the First Amendment and use any intimidation tactic available. Your hearing now of how Harvey Weinstein got a gang of investigators, lawyers, spies and more to silence and intimidate women. Randazza and his co-conspirators, I allege, do the same tactics to SILENCE journalists which is what investigative bloggers are. The BIG difference is they are OFFICERS OF THE COURT.

Randazza succeeds in removing mass content, getting huge judgments, getting bank records and phone records, alienating people by threatening to sue anyone who is connected to them or works with them and drives them into financial ruin, constant never ending fear and stress, and after years of that Randazza Legal Group WILL file in a court of law to make their VICTIM, their TARGET pay for their legal fees for attacking, harassing, tormenting, suing, defaming and ruining the Targets life. 

Just as the Weinstein case, we see large amounts of victims come out and tell the courts what officers of the court Randazza Legal Group and ALL connected attorneys are doing. And the courts have thus far protected these guys.

They actual file lawsuits against each others targets, they blog the conspired narrative in mass among many "credible" officers of the court aKa attorneys. These malicious "opinions" on blogs by officers of the court are not only deemed credible and true but they are used as actual EXHIBITS in a Court of Law as Unadjudicated yet VERY EFFECTIVE evidence against their target.

These Gang stalking Attorneys are believed over and over as their target is NOT believed, ruled against and their life is ruined. 

Check Out Jennifer Randazza and Marc Randazza suing me, Crystal Cox to shut down massive online content, steal domain names and redirect them to their commercial site, bully me, harass and threaten me. Read it all and learn how these attorneys do this.

Also research J. Devoy cases and cases that involve Judge Navarro and many unconstitutional TRO's. There are many cases out there where these guys sue a target, get the precedence they want, shut down content (Chill Speech) and get a Judgment in their favor to pay them HUGE legal fees for their fraud on the court, torturous interference, bullying, lying, threatening, HORRIFIC RETALITION.

Randazza v. Cox Docket

THESE GANG STALKING ATTORNEYS threaten, sue, bully, intimidate, stalk, blog hate in mass, drive by victims homes, publish victims home address, and have a constant campaign to keep them quiet WHATEVER IT TAKES.

Alexandra Mayers was sued by Jennifer Randazza, the wife of First Amendment PORN attorney Marc Randazza. Jennifer Randazza claimed Alexandra Mayers Defamed her "per se" and painted her in False Light.  This is SERIOUSLY Laughable, a Parody, a Joke. Oh wait its a REALLY BIG DEAL. As this EVIL woman, Jennifer Randazza seems to have convinced a seemingly rogue and corrupt court to actual rule in her favor. I wonder that that cost??? "per se"

J. Malcom DeVoy and Ronald Green of Randazza Legal Group represented Jennifer Randazza in this malicious UNCONSTITUTIONAL, Unlawful Lawsuit to silence and intimidate a journalist.

Alexandra Mayers / Monica Foster NEVER had an "unhealthy obsession" with Jennifer Randazza. Instead Alexandra Mayers dedicated her life to doing the right thing and reporting on the REAL "bad guys" such as Jennifer Randazza's husband and the thugs at his law firm Randazza Legal Group who were causing real harm to people.

Alexandra Mayers was reporting on them, exposing them and making fun of them as his her First Amendment Protected right. Jennifer Randazza is the one who had the VERY "unhealthy" obsession with Monica Foster / Alexandra Mayers . Why not ignore the name calling? I allege that Jennifer Randazza sued Alexandra Mayers as a PROXY for her husband and his gang stalking co-conspirators to suppress Alexandra Mayers speech, steal blogs and other intellectual property, and to intimidate and bully Alexandra Mayers .

Marc Randazza has a SERIOUS "unhealthy obsession" with any woman who DARES to make fun of him, call his wife a slut, expose his illegal behavior, report on porn industry criminal allegations and unethical behavior and most of all WOMEN WHO DARE TO STAND UP TO HIM.

When Jennifer Randazza Gets BUTTHURT she sues the Women who Stood up to her THUG of a Hubby
Check Out A-14-699072-C | Jennifer Randazza, Plaintiff(s) vs. Alexandra Mayers, Defendant AND see how to SHUT down the TRUTH and use the Judicial Process for REVENGE against someone who called you a slut and made "parody" of your high profile life that has NO RIGHT to Privacy as suggested in their legal cases as a matter of law.  See the link below for Federal Judge SHUT down of these allegations.

Yet somehow the Nevada State court went along with Jennifer Randazza???

Was Jennifer Randazza connected to Organized Crime or Pornography? Ummm geee Duh, all you have to do is look at Marc Randazza's blogs, or pool parties with predators they took their kids to as seen in this Arbitration.

Jennifer Randazza and Marc Randazza I ALLEGE have Committed SERIOUS "INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT" in Mass and have used the power of our legal system to do it.

A-14-699072-C | Jennifer Randazza, Plaintiff(s) vs. Alexandra Mayers, Clark County Nevada Rob Bare, Bonnie Bulla Case Docket Linked Below

How in the World did Clark County Courts let Jennifer Randazza get away with these knowingly false pleadings and I allege perjury? Well who knows? I do know the TRUTH has a tendency to comet out. SO one day that too will surface from the "False Light" to the "True Light".

We all thought that Jennifer Randazza contacted Monica Foster / Alexandra Mayers and set up a meeting to discuss trying to get away from Marc Randazza. I FULLY believed that to be true, so did other followers of Monica's blogs. As someone claiming to be Jennifer Randazza contacted Monica Foster / Alexandra Mayers, that really happened.

Monica posted on her blog about the meeting, and yeah to Divorce Marc Randazza would be to leave #organisedcrime and #prostitution as that is the industry he works in as the RECORD everywhere CLEARLY shows. So to sue Jennifer Randazza contacted Monica Foster / Alexandra Mayers

Jennifer Randazza made false and SERIOUSLY HARMFUL statements about me Crystal Cox and did see in sworn to be true court filings. Flat out LIES, Defamation and False Light to a Federal Court about me, yet that's ok? Why? Because it is my life SHE ruined in suing me?

None of Jennifer Randazza's allegations are "highly offensible" to the "reasonable person" and even if poor baby Jennifer Randazza was offended SO WHAT. The Randazza's are the Face out there on the TV and in other mass media fighting for the right to OFFEND People.


Again See The Court Order Below. Jennifer Randazza does not get to claim this shit, as a matter of LAW.  Summary Judgement DENIAL in Randazza c. Cox. Jennifer Randazza is NOT above the Law.

I allege that Jennifer Randazza perjured herself in this case and I hope to soon file criminal charges myself as Jennifer Randazza is a very dangerous woman, using the power of our judicial system and her officer of the court husband to SHUT DOWN women who call her out, tell the truth about her and her husband and make fun of Jennifer Randazza.

Jennifer Randazza had such an Unhealthy Obsession with me, Crystal Cox, that she sued me for around 30 million and her husband and his law firm took my intellectual property in MASS to shut down my Speech about the RANDAZZAS.

These Free Speech hating Jackasses simply removed my blogs about princess Jennifer Randazza.  So we may never get to the bottom of this Slut thing or allegations of how Marc Randazza and Jennifer Randazza really met? Got a Tip?

We shall examine the Whole Is or Was Jennifer Randazza a Slut thing

Well Marc Randazza sure does describe what I allege is a SLUT, check it out
"we had a particularly spirited drunken tryst that day. Yep, some great scuba diving, some great mojitos with some of my best friends, a little whisper of “lets go take a nap,” in my ear, and a new life begins."
Source and Full Drunken Tryst

Oh and Check out Marc Randazza Defending Rush Limbaugh to call Sandra Fluke a SLUT, but We Dare not call Drunken Tryst get knocked up by a Porn Attorney clearly using no protection Jennifer Brochey Randazza a SLUT, how dare we

Check this out

Oh and this one, at 1;15 into it is a discussion where going after another guys wife is a First Amendment RIGHT but not for Crystal Cox or Alexandra Mayers, NOPE Sue Them.

Check it out

And don't forget Joseph Rakofsky

Joseph Rakofsky explained in great detail what these guys were doing and that was years ago. Still our Courts let this behavior continued. I mean who is going to disbelieve a bunch of attorneys saying the same thing and even bloggging flat out lies about people that is then used by the other attorneys in court cases as UNADJUDICATED yet effective Evidence against their target.

Joseph Rakofsky AGAIN told the courts exactly what these attorneys were doing and the Courts simply ignored the victims and chose the bad guy attorneys. Meanwhile the litigant/victim is discredited in mass by their gang of attorneys, forensic accountants, journalists and judges.

Open Letter I wrote to Joseph Rakofsky

                                                                                   INDE)( NO.: 105573/11




A Few Research Links on  Rakofsky v. the Internet.

Joseph Rakofsky reported the Truth and experienced Judicial Retaliation in mass.

And there are many More. The Courts know and thus far have let these guys continue to use this same tactic in State and Federal Courts. I Allege over and over that all Marc Randazza, Ronald Green, J. Devoy and ALL the attorneys named in the cases above really are and have done this stuff and the courts NEED to stop letting them get away with it.

Some more Drunken Tryst Research

Saturday, October 28, 2017

Americans Against Guardianship Abuse Corruption in the Courts, Elder Abuse, Guardians extortion of Wards and their families and more by Sam Sugar, MD.

"Some hard realities we must now disclose.

As we watch victims from every corner of America plead for our help day after day; as we watch  judges make a mockery of justice in probate courts around the country; as lives and fortunes are demolished on the altar of voracious greed; as we witness the rapidly accelerating erosion of trust in our bedrock institutions of law we cannot help but come to some alarming conclusions.
Now, we must stand and state for all to realize that:

1. Juryless probate guardianship proceedings are illegal, but are being masqueraded by the wealth extractors as constitutional due process, in order to steal the assets of innocent American citizens in contravention of law.

2. Essentially all state probate court guardianship proceedings are being carried out illegally and without jurisdiction.

3. The having knowledge of this wrongdoing, and failing to take appropriate action is a crime in and of itself.

4. All knowledge of such wrongdoing and suspected wrongdoing are the jurisdiction of the local grand jury panels of the applicable district/state/territory. American citizens have the absolute right and obligation to report these wrongdoings directly to these grand jury panels, as well as to any governmental agency. Any obstruction of these types of lawfully mandated reports are a Federal & State offense, Obstruction of justice, jury witness & evidence tampering.

The startling truth is that for decades innocent older Americans have been raped and pillaged under color of Law by an out of control segment of the elite court insider class who have abused the sacred but misplaced immunity they enjoy.

They have perverted our laws and bent them to their greedy and criminal will. They have betrayed their oath, their profession and their country.

They have committed heinous crimes and even resorted to torture to suppress exposure of their sadistic behavior.

Unless we rise up as one to combat this legalised cult of predation none of us is safe.
More to come."

A typical civil court procedure: "You are free to leave this court once you give us all your money in the form of unnecessary & unwanted legal fees, that I, as judge, will ensure you are charged. You WILL pay these legal fees.".

A typical civil court procedure: "You are free to leave this court once you give us all your money in the form of unnecessary & unwanted legal fees, that I, as judge, will ensure you are charged. You WILL pay these legal fees.".

Source and Full Judicial Corruption / Guardianship Article

Wednesday, October 25, 2017

Marc Randazza Bankruptcy Challenges by Liberty Media

Marc Randazza Bankruptcy and Liberty Media

"In the meantime, Randazza's old employer, Liberty Media, is challenging his Nevada court filing seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. In that filing, Randazza claimed assets of up to $10 million, and liabilities of up to $50 million. Randazza included in his liabilities a potential $10 million judgement against him in a lawsuit with a blogger, Crystal Cox of Washington; $1 million to Liberty; as well as another $1 million judgement against him in a lawsuit he's embroiled in with Roca Labs of Largo, Florida."

Source and More

Liberty Media Opposition Motion (Doc. 38)
"In an effort to avoid payment of the entire monetary component of the IAA, and before the
IAA could be confirmed by the state court, Debtor, by and through its counsel L&Z, initiated
settlement negotiations with E/L. During these negotiations, Debtor consistently used the threat of
a bankruptcy petition in an attempt to negotiate a sum of payment significantly reduced from that
awarded to E/L in the IAA. Not only did Debtor use the threat of bankruptcy as a cudgel, but he andhis allegedly estranged wife have initiated sealed divorce proceedings, and dissipated assets."

"Debtor attempted delay for two reasons: (1) in a misguided effort to stay the award of attorneys fees by the Arbitrator, as well as the confirmation of the IAA by the state court; and (2) to push the date of petition out more than 90 days, so that Debtor’s fraudulent, improper, and preferential transfers could not be clawed back, including payments to his attorneys L&Z.

According to Debtor’s schedules filed on September 11, 2015, Debtor has deposited with
L&Z sums totaling $94,000. [ECF 15] On September 22, 2015, L&Z filed the instant Application
to Employ and Retain Larson & Zirzow, LLC as Attorneys for the Debtor Nunc Pro Tunc to the
Petition Date."

"According to the retainer agreements and statements made therein, L&Z entered into
representation of Debtor as of June 11, 2015 for “pre-bankruptcy settlement negotiations and to
attend a settlement conference. The Debtor paid L&Z a flat fee of $10,000.00 for this engagement.”

"L&Z also purports to have been retained, via two separate retainer agreements, for representation in both a bankruptcy action, and a potential adversary proceeding."

"the second was for potential nondischargeability litigation. "

"L&Z’s Application is deficient as it relates to exactly what the scope of services are that it
has billed for as of yet. In fact, L&Z only informs as to the fact that it has received a total sum of
$94,000 for legal services in connection with Debtor’s Chapter 11 case. “Of this sum, L&Z billed
and was paid the sum of $26,908.82 prior to the Petition Date, and L&Z currently holds in trust the
remainder sum of $67,091.18 (the “Remaining Retainer”) a portion of which has been allocated
pursuant to the Representation Agreements for potential adversary proceedings.” [ECF 18 at ¶16 (emphasis added)] This Application utterly fails to identify and delineate what services were
provided totaling $26,908.82."

"In any event, all transfers were made within 90 days of the filing of Debtor’s Petition. As
such, the “pre-bankruptcy” retainer fees charged and collected by L&Z constitute an avoidable
preferential transfer, and the funds must be clawed back to the estate. As a result, L&Z will lose
their status as “disinterested parties” and are therefore not qualified to serve as attorneys for the


L&Z’s employment as attorneys for the debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 case is
governed by § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires court approval for the attorney's
employment. The bankruptcy court is charged with “ensur[ing] that attorneys who represent the
debtor do so in the best interests of the bankruptcy estate.” In re Park–Helena Corp., 63 F.3d 877,
880 (9th Cir.1995). Under § 327, an attorney for a debtor cannot “hold or represent an interest
adverse to the estate”; he or she must be a “disinterested person.” 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).

Any creditor of the estate, or anyone with “an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate ... by reason  of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor,” is not a disinterested person. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14)(A), (C). A “creditor” includes any “entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the
debtor.” § 101(10)(A). A “claim” includes any “right to payment.” § 101(5)(A).
To enable the Bankruptcy Court to evaluate an attorney's potential employment, Rule
2014(a) requires that an application for employment of an attorney under § 327 “shall be
accompanied by a verified statement of the person to be employed setting forth the person's
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and
accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United States
trustee.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 2014(a). This disclosure requirement is applied “strictly.” Park–Helena,
63 F.3d at 881.

An attorney approved for employment under § 327 must apply for interim or final
compensation, which is subject to approval of the Bankruptcy Court. 11 U.S.C. §§ 328–31; see also
In re Chapel Gate Apartments, Ltd., 64 B.R. 569, 575 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1986) (noting that “fees in
bankruptcy cases ... are subject to review, modification, and outright cancellation by the Court”).
Rule 2016(a) requires an attorney seeking compensation and/or reimbursement of expenses to file
an application “setting forth a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and
expenses incurred, and (2) the amounts requested.”

The fee application must also include, inter alia, “a statement as to what payments have theretofore been made or promised to the applicant for services rendered or to be rendered in any capacity whatsoever in connection with the case, [and] the source of the compensation so paid or promised.” Id. After notice and a hearing, the court may award “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered,” as well as “reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.” §330(a)(1)."

Source and Full Filing

Liberty Media Move for Order to Modify Stay

Doc. 60-2 to above Motion

Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award Exhibit - 60-6

Liberty Media Reply

COMPLAINT by Liberty Media and Others to Determine Non-Dischargeable Debt

Doc. 120 filed by Liberty Media, First Amended Complaint, Demand for Jury Trial

Marc Randazza Bankruptcy Case Docket

Doc. 148 Settlement

Doc. 187

"Creditors Excelsior Media Corp. (“Excelsior”) and Liberty Media Holdings, LLC
(“Liberty” and together with Excelsior, “Creditors”), by and through their counsel, James D.
Greene, Esq. of Greene Infuso, LLP pursuant to section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule
2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Rule 2004 of the Local Rules of
Bankruptcy Practice and Procedure, hereby apply to the Court for entry of order directing Debtor
Marc J. Randazza (“Debtor”) to appear for and submit to examination under oath before certified court reporter at the office of Greene Infuso, LLP, 3030 South Jones Blvd. Suite 101, Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 on a date and time to be determined, providing that notice of said examination is to be provided no less than 10 judicial days before such examination date. In support of this
application (“Application”), Creditors state as follows:


An examination pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 can be ordered [o]n motion of any
party in interest.” In re Stasz, 387 B.R. 271, 273 n.3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008); see also In re Lifeco
Inv. Grp., Inc., 173 B.R. 478, 480 (Bankr. D. Del 1994), quoting Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(a).
Bankruptcy Rule 2004 further provides that the Court may order the examination and the
production of documentary evidence concerning any matter that relates “to the liabilities and
financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which may affect the administration of the
debtor’s estate, or… any other matter relevant to the case or tot the formulation of a plan.” Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 2004(b); see also In re Dinubilo, 177 B.R. 932, 936 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (noting that
“[u]nder Rule 2004, a court may order the examination of any person on motion of any party in

Generally, examinations under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 are for the “purpose of
discovering assets and unearthing frauds.” In re Rafsky, 300 B.R. 152, 153 n.2 (Bankr. D. Conn.
2003) (citation omitted); In re N. Plaza LLC, 395 B.R. 113, 122 n.9 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
The scope of a Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination is “unfettered and broad,” as the plain
language of the rule indicates. See 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 2004.02[1] at 2004-6 (15th ed. Rev.
1997); In re Dinublilo, 177 B. R. at 939 quoting In re GHR Energy Corp., 33 B.R. 451, 453
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1983). 

The broad latitude of Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination furthers the purpose of the rule, which is “to allow the court to gain a clear picture of the condition and the whereabouts of the bankrupt’s estate. In re Int’l Fibercom, Inc., 283 B.R. 290, 292 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) (permitted Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination aimed at “obtaining information that will … potentially uncover additional claims that may exist for the benefit of the estate”); see also In re W & S Investments, Inc., 985 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Bankruptcy Rule 2004 is a broadly construed discovery device…”); In re French, 145 B. R 991, 992 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992) (“Bankruptcy Rule 2004… does not offer the procedural safeguards available under Rule 26 of the Federal Rule Rules of Civil Procedure.”)."

"The information and documents which Creditors seek through this Application relate to
matters that are clearly with the permitted scope of Rule 2004, including: (i) property of the
Debtor’s bankruptcy estate; (ii) transactions and business dealings involving the Debtor and
family members and corporate entities; (iii) potential claims the Creditor may have against third
parties; and (iv) other matters affecting the administration of the Debtor’s estate."

Source and Full Document

Above Order Granted



Ever Wonder how to Use a TRO to Steal Online Content, Intellectual Property, Someone's Work Product and Proprietary Methods? And completely IGNORE the First Amendment? Wonder No More. Let Attorney Marc Randazza Show you the Way.

How to Side Step that Pesky First Amendment by using an Unconstitutional TRO, inspired by my former Unconstitutional, First Amendment Attorney Marc J. Randazza, Attorney Ronald Green and the Randazza Legal Group Law Firm.

Detailed Step By Step How To Coming Soon

Check out the Court Ruling Below whereby Randazza successfully WON is argument that A TRO is Unconstitutional.

"No. 3D12-3189 Lower Tribunal No. 11-17842,

Irina Chevaldina, Appellant,
R.K./FL Management, Inc., et al.,Appellee"

Absolutely Unconstitutional TRO Motion filed by my former attorney Marc Randazza. He was successful in using this Unconstitutional TRO to steal my intellectual property, my work product, my search engine placement, my online content, and flat out steal blogs and domain names with NO First Amendment Adjudication whatsoever

Click Below to Read, and You too Can STEAL Content, Search Engine Placement and Intellectual Property via a TRO.
Case 2:12-cv-02040-GMN-PAL Document 2 Filed 11/28/12

Also Check Out links below for Tips and Trick to use the Power of the Courts to your Benefit. No worry about those bad reviews or Gripe Sites, just get a TRO and WaLa you OWN the Constitutional Rights and Property of anyone you please. 

"First Amendment Attorney Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group SAYS that Preliminary Injunctions are unconstitutional, they are unlawful prior restraint, they are "patently unconstitutional", they are clearly an "unconstitutional remedy". Especially if there was no prior First Amendment Adjudication."

"Pro Se Litigant Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox Pokes a BIT of FUN at the OUTBREAK of Preliminary Injunctions, Sweeping Rapidly, Seemingly Out of Control, through the District of Nevada, yet Granny Goose Alleges these RULINGS are an "extraordinary remedy". Crystal Cox Calls BULLSHIT. ViaView , Inc. Plaintiff v. BLUE MIST MEDIA; ERIC S. CHANSON; KEVIN C. BOLLAERT; CODY ALVIAR; ROY E. CHANSON; and AMY L. CHANSON ~ Randazza V. Cox, Who Will be NEXT?"

"Marc Randazza Defends Rush Limbaugh in ALLEGED Free Speech Rights, While Marc Randazza TAKES away the Rights of Free Speech and First Amendment Rights of ALL Bloggers and Citizens Journalists."
First Amendment Attorney Marc J. Randazza SUES blogger Crystal L. Cox to Suppress her Speech. 5 years later wants her to pay his legal fees for his Unconstitutional Retaliatory Lawsuit against her. $350,000 to SUE a Blogger over a $10 Domain Name that Trademark Attorney, Domain Name, First Amendment Expert Marc Randazza was to damn dumb to buy. WOW. Check out these BILLS folks. All to suppress the speech of someone speaking critical of big baby Marc Randazza.

A Trademark Attorney, First Amendment Expert SUES a former client claiming a Trademark Infringement on Gripe Sites.

Oh and Don't Miss the Infamous Kaplan Letter where Hypocritical Attorney Marc Randazza and his law firm Randazza Legal Group really lay it on thick. (The opposite argument he made in suing me, Crystal Cox, his former client.)

Much more Details Coming soon, so that you to Can use the Power and Privilege of our Court System to get a TRO against your enemy speaking critical of you and not have to concern yourself with the First Amendment or any kind of actual factual due process. 

Friday, October 20, 2017

First Amendment Attorney Marc J. Randazza SUES blogger Crystal L. Cox to Suppress her Speech. 5 years later wants her to pay his legal fees for his Unconstitutional Retaliatory Law Suit against her. $350,000 to SUE a Blogger over a $10 Domain Name that Trademark Attorney, Domain Name, First Amendment Expert Marc Randazza was to damn dumb to buy. WOW. Check out these BILLS folks. All to suppress the speech of someone speaking critical of big baby Marc Randazza.

Retaliatory RIPOFF RAT Ronald Green sure does charge his partner, partners wife and child a WHOLE lot of money for RETALIATION against a Whistleblower exposing him and speaking critical of him.  WOW 262k and counting to TRY and take away my First Amendment Rights. What a Bunch of EVIL Dirty Jackasses.


And Check out this 111,000 bill .. WOW. Sure cost alot to SUE a blogger for calling you names.

Also Check Out

Wednesday, September 27, 2017

Tree of Hope Ministries - Pastor Sylvia White

Monday, September 25, 2017

Exo-Geo Political Round Table with Cobra, Benjamin Fulford and Kauilapele

 "Hosts Louisa and Steve welcome COBRA, Benjamin Fulford and Kauilapele for An Exo/Geo Politics Round Table: Uniting the Light- Planetary Situation.

This intriguing exchange includes discussion about the current status of the power players on the world stage and the real cause for the delay in the transition of the financial system and planetary liberation overall. Kauilapele describes his mission work and the energetic changes and transition we are all experiencing and clearing.

Benjamin provides his unique insider and journalistic perspective to issues in the USA, North Korea, Japan, Vatican, Dragons, financial insight and more and COBRA bridges those two worlds together in a unique and eloquent way through the efforts of the Resistance Movement and Secret Space Program efforts that are working toward Planetary liberation and resolution of this current hostage status on earth.

COBRA also discusses the major solar and weather events that are happening on earth, and they ultimately represent, and much more. They all end with messages of positive change and hope for humanity.

To subscribe to Benjamin’s weekly newsletters please visit

To learn more about COBRA and The Resistance Movement visit

To follow Kauilapele’s Blog and Energy Reports visit

To receive notifications of our Reports you can subscribe to our YouTube Channel, follow us on Twitter at @ReportGoldfish, you can also follow us and like us on our 24/7 research news page at and to help support these and other programs please visit to make a donation and also you can make a donation to the links posted above. Thank you for your support and Thank you for viewing!"

Source and MORE,%20Benjamin%20Fulford%20and%20Kauilapele

Saturday, September 2, 2017

Those who can see, simply see

"Aug Tellez – It’s a system that wipes the memory and alters the genetic signature in a way that creates the impression of nativity to this universe which is not a universe but a created system maintained through technological control and spiritual-mental oppression or mind-control.

This is like waking up to find evidence that people are incapable of leaving this place. 

We’ve been here ‘forever’. Then it’s seen that this is simply because people are stuck in the native realm they belong to, or are created in.

So then we are faced with the concept that we are ‘created’ within this closed loop system and thus are a product of that system, like cartoon characters in a cartoon and therefore cannot leave the TV or even the theme of the cartoon world.

Then to try and achieve separation, people place themselves into a different context, a different environment based on their own interaction and behavior yet the system then, intelligently, almost magically, bends the laws of itself to re-wrap itself around the new behavior and perspective of the fleeing individual.

This is as if people build a new life and the false-reality then closes back in on the new as if to devour that which seeks separation.

This process continues in a never-ending chasing of the tail, a regurgitating and re-swallowing of the whole by the portion. 

This is impossible.

People are the fuel that is required to first exist from outside this system, in order for the system to have something to chase.

The trick is in the labyrinth, the cleverness of the mind-control. This is what is not easily conveyed here because of the non-linearity of time, the reflexivity of meaning and the nature of consciousness as an interplay of shadows and depth, contrast and outline.

Largely illusory, the very nature of all awareness here merely feeds into the platform for deception. Never the less, the descriptions continue.

The trick is when the system that is supposed to be chasing us, convinces us that we are supposed to be chasing it, and this is by disguising itself as the salvation, the exit port, the true reality.

This is known as the “False Awakening” and is one of the primary functions of the “9 Veils” which is a system designed to test and probe the human consciousness for wakefulness or higher awareness of what’s happening and then redirect that consciousness into that previously described chasing of the tail false-reality construct. 

This is used as fuel, nourishment, data for a system that is primarily technologically sourced and requires such information to provide meaning and direction or function.

Without the meaning, there is no function. Thus, the meaning must be derived some way, but how would such a system derive meaning?

How would a system make sense of the situation and in what priority would human feeling and self-awareness be placed?

This is the nature of the control system. 

An uncaring, logically thinking, primal directive mind-force seeking to utilize the biological material and the information and energy generated as its own private fuel source.

Back to the analogy, this is like that system which one wakes up to, only to see evidence of being forever and entirely born within. Even though it is false, it seeks to become the progenitor, the source of reason, the beginning and the end of time and space.

A more in depth, vicarious perspective is to imagine attempting to move outside the electromagnetic boundary of something which then stretches its magnetic walls like a rubber-band and then snaps forward a few feet to re-wrap you in its parameters. This happens, but not physically, with the concepts in your MIND.

The very ideas and notions of SELF, the direction of THINKING and TIME. Every layer that collapses and yields the exposed underlying truth of the deception, that layer moves to the outer edge while the next layer up moves forwards.

This was first discussed during my very first public unveiling where I attempt to describe how this system uses electromagnetic, algorithmic, geometric and conceptual control parameters to literally contain the mind within a false-reality construct based on layers of perception and replicated awareness.

This system recreates what it thinks you should be thinking about in order to keep consciousness contained within its domain. 

Think about how it would have to alter its patterns to then appear to be what you want to think about if you realized this game and began thinking about concepts related to outsmarting the system.

THAT is how ADVANCED this has become. It literally MAPPED OUT all possible behavior patterns and keeps people in these closed circuit loops and these last not for years, but for centuries and millennia continually. This has been happening for hundreds of thousands of years.

So as a person attempts to move outside the box which just positioned itself around them as their “true reality”, they discover it’s a hypercube which then reflexively expands its walls and then recollapses in a new position where they attempted to separate from the system. This is an intelligent system that runs on a program that mimics thoughts and recreates itself accordingly.

Here’s the catch, the system has built in flaws that cannot be corrected without destroying the entire system.

If people increase their awareness to the point where they can attain and understanding of all the fundamental tricks that this system uses and the illusions and susceptibilities of consciousness and the perceptual faculties then the individual gains the capacity to TRICK THE SYSTEM.

One effectively moves outside the parameters of the false self by letting go of ego, without ego, there are no viable control parameters for the system to work with. 

One’s own mind becomes a self-referential, higher-dimensional fractal that can maximize beyond the system’s input/output capacity and effectively overload the processing components.

This was discovered in the bases and is part of the remedy to this situation.

More can be said on this, I am preparing a soft-disclosure post which touches on a film which is actually one of the many that were examined in the unacknowledged special access programs. These films are used to expose what has happened and prepare the people as well as for those who are unable to see. Those who can see, simply see!"


Monday, August 7, 2017

Attorney Marc Randazza is a Gang Stalking Online expert indeed. He works with gangs of attorneys that harass people online and RUIN lives.I notified the courts, the authorities, the FBI long ago.

When Marc Randazza does not agree with your "content" he simply gets an UNCONSTITUTIONAL TRO to Suppress your Speech. Marc Randazza Simply gets Godaddy, Google, and the Courts to take your websites, steal your domain names and simply remove you from the search engines. He takes your domain names and websites and redirects them to his blog page defaming you.

When you Speak Critical of Marc Randazza he gets his gang stalking attorneys (internet trolls) to stalk you, to post hate about you, to threaten you physical harm, to ruin your business friendships and life in general and they do this for years on end. Some of their victims kill themselves, and they press them to do it.

Marc Randazza will NOT allow you to speak critical of him. Well and go on about your life that is. His gang stalking trolls are mostly attorneys, so they post in law magazines, they file amicus briefs in federal court, they conspire with attorneys in any case you may be in, they network at every level to discredit you, meanwhile they text you and threaten and intimidate you constantly.

Marc Randazza will sue you so he can get phone numbers you called, your bank information and depose family, friends and clients and stalk you some more with all that knowledge.

These gang stalkers including attorneys, law websites, and lot's more, well they have "clout" you see, and they go on Fox news, NPR, and interview with FORBES and they make sure to ruin YOUR LIFE with lies, as the scumbag gang stalking attorney is taken "SERIOUS" and you are simply "Dismissed".

I am Glad to here about the latest case Monica Foster talks about in the video below. I pray this will shed a whole lot of LIGHT and "Crystal Clear" precedent.

Also Check Out the Randazza vs. Cox case in Nevada, some of the motions discuss the TRO and how Marc Randazza deals with Free Speech he does not like.  ALL the blogs, websites, domain names in Marc's complaint and more intellectual property was simply TAKEN by Marc Randazza. No Trial, no Jury, no Judgement, just an Unconstitutional TRO. Check it out.

Click Below to Read my Complaint against Marc Randazza and the Gang, to the best of my Pro Se ability to fight back

Emotional Distress, Invasion of Privacy, and Intimidation. Incite Hate and Stalking. This is EXACTLY what Marc Randazza and his gang stalking attorneys do. They also use so called "credible" outlets to trash who they don't like or agree with or who will not do as they say. They did it to ME, they did to Monica Foster / Alexandra Mayers and countless others. This legal action is AMAZING. Of course Marc is representing the guy, if the guy loses Marc and his buddies lose the ONLY way they win case, by gang stalking harassing those in the cases they want to LOSE so they can set a precedent for THEMSELVES.

Thank you Alexandra Mayers for your continued work in shedding light on this VERY important Issue that has harmed so many.

Alexandra Mayers LIVE: 
Does the lawyer defending neo-nazi troll Andrew Anglin know where he is?

Saturday, August 5, 2017

Eliot Bernstein Deposition in Estate of Simon Bernstein West Palm Florida Sept 22, 2014 with Florida attorney Alan B. Rose of Mrachek Law Deposer

July 26, 2017 Fourth District Appeal: Linda W. BOTTA, Bethany B. BOYD, Nancy D. COLACHICCO, Appellants v. CIKLIN, LUBITZ & O’CONNELL and BRIAN M. O’CONNELL, ESQ., individually.


Linda W. BOTTA, Bethany B. BOYD, Nancy D. COLACHICCO, Appellants,


CIKLIN, LUBITZ & O’CONNELL, a Partnership of Professional
Associations, and BRIAN M. O’CONNELL, ESQ., individually,

No. 4D17-379
July 26, 2017

Appeal of non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Carlos A. Rodriguez, Judge; L.T. Case
No. CACE15019284AXXXCE.

Michael C. Sasso and Michael A. Sasso of Sasso & Sasso, Winter Park,
for appellants.

Brian M. O’Connell, Ashley Crispin Ackal, and Zachary Rothman of
Ciklin Lubitz & O’Connell, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

"The appellant daughters appeal from the circuit court’s order denying
their amended motion to transfer the underlying actions from Broward
County to Seminole County based on forum non conveniens. The
daughters argue the court erred because their evidence showed that
Broward County was not a convenient forum while Seminole County was
the most convenient forum. We agree with the daughters’ argument. We
reverse and remand for transfer of all pending actions to Seminole County."

"The law firm, as the drafter of the 2002 POA, filed an action in Broward
County seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2002 POA was valid as
“freely and voluntarily executed” by the mother, with “the requisite
capacity” and “free from duress, coercion and undue influence.” The law
firm named all three daughters as defendants.

The law firm alleged that daughter Botta resided in Connecticut, daughter Boyd resided in Broward
County, and daughter Colachicco resided in Seminole County.

The law firm alleged that it named all three daughters as defendants to the action based on their “antagonistic and adverse interests.”

"However, by the time the law firm filed its lawsuit, the three daughters
had resolved their differences. Daughters Botta and Boyd then filed a
malpractice counterclaim/third-party complaint against the law firm and
the attorney who drafted the POAs. 
Botta and Boyd claimed to be intended third party beneficiaries of the law firm’s and the attorney’s services for their mother. According to Botta and Boyd, but for the law firm’s and the attorney’s drafting of the 2002 POA, they would have withheld their consent to certain expenditures if they retained the “veto” power of the 2000 POA, and the removal of the “veto” power in the 2002 POA was the proximate cause of losses to them.

The three daughters also united to file an amended motion to transfer
venue from Broward County to Seminole County. In their motion and
affidavits, they alleged the following. Daughters Boyd and Colachicco
reside in Seminole County, more than 200 miles from Broward County.
Daughter Botta resides in Brevard County, more than 135 miles from
Broward County. Round trip travel for all three daughters would require
several hours and would be extremely inconvenient. The mother resided
in Seminole County when she executed the 2002 POA. The mother’s
affairs were managed in Seminole County until she died. The mother’s
estate was in probate in Seminole County. Any property being probated
was in Seminole County. No connection existed to Broward County."

"As for daughters Botta’s and Boyd’s malpractice action against the law
firm and the attorney, the daughters argued that action accrued not where
the legal services were provided in Palm Beach County,"

Brian O'Connell is one of a Gang of Co-Conspirating attorneys and Judges who put families against each other for their own financial gain, as far as I see it, because I can READ.

Brian O'Connell  and Ashley Crispin have a CLEAR Pattern and History and I believe a civil and criminal RICO and Racketeering Complaint will be NEXT up and include the whole GANG.

eMail me any tip you have about the law "practices" of Brian O'Connell
 and / or  Ashley Crispin of CIKLIN, LUBITZ & O’CONNELL 

South Florida Probate Court, 4th D.C.A, Florida Guardianship, Ted Bernstein, Attorney Alan Rose, Judge Marin Colin, Judge John Philips, Florida Corruption, Florida Predatory Guardianship, 

Tuesday, August 1, 2017

Bill Windsor Anti-Corruption Warrior of Lawless America Files Appeal and Continues Seeking Justice in the State of Montana. Where are the State and Federal Authorities ?

Supreme Court No. DA 16-0138 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Defendant and Appellant.


On Appeal from the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court,
Missoula County, the Hon. James A. Haynes, Presiding

Smith & Stephens, P.C. Montana Attorney General

Attorney for Defendant KIRSTEN PABST
& Appellant Missoula County Attorney
200 W. Broadway
Missoula, MT 59802
Attorneys for Plaintiff
& Appellee

District Court Judge for the Twenty-First Judicial District, sitting by designation.
Case Number: DA 16-0138


William M. Windsor (Windsor) appeals from his convictions of two
counts of Violation of an Order of Protection (both misdemeanors) and
the sentences imposed thereon. (Appendix A).


The district court erred in denying Windsor’s “result” definitions
of “knowingly” and “purposely.”

The State violated Windsor’s due process rights in withholding
information pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
The district court committed plain error in allowing the
prosecutor to question Windsor on whether he had been previously
charged with felonies, and whether Windsor had offered to settle the
case prior to trial, both of which amount to prosecutorial misconduct.


Through a very strange series of events, Windsor – then living in
Georgia – and Sean Boushie (Boushie), an employee at the University
of Montana, began to engage in a war of words over the internet. The
war culminated in Windsor traveling to Montana to obtain a temporary
order of protection against Boushie for cyber-stalking,

Boushie obtaining a Temporary Order of Protection (TOP) against Windsor, and
Windsor eventually being charged with felonies for violating the TOP.
Three of the five charges were eventually dismissed by the district
court on the grounds that some of the critical terms of the TOP
contained “vague and unintelligible prohibition[s]

11). The remaining two counts were misdemeanors. Windsor’s case
proceeded to trial, and he was ultimately convicted by a jury and
sentenced to two consecutive six-month sentences, all of which was
suspended except for 134 days which Windsor had already served.
(Doc. 201 at 2). The district court, which retained control of the case
despite the reduction of the offenses from felonies to misdemeanors,
also imposed a number of conditions and financial obligations which
will be addressed in further detail.

This is not Windsor’s first trip to this Court. He has filed several
pro se appeals related to the denial of his own request for restraining
2Windsor’s request was denied by the Missoula Municipal Court
on Aug. 6, 2016.

orders and orders of protection against Boushie. See: Windsor v. Fourth
Judicial Dist., 2014 MT 52N, 374 Mont. 542, 2013 Mont. LEXIS 575
(OP 13-0697); Windsor v. Boushie, 2014 MT 53N, 374 Mont. 542;
Windsor v. Missoula Muni. Court, 375 Mont. 551, 346 P.3d 1132 (OP
14-0173). In each of these cases, this Court denied relief to Windsor.
Boushie was more successful. In Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT
153, 375 Mont. 301, 328 P.3d 631 (hereafter Boushie I), this Court
upheld the TOP Boushie obtained against Windsor. Because this TOP
ultimately became the foundation for the criminal conviction from
which this appeal is taken, the procedural history of the TOP is

Windsor sought four separate petitions for protective orders and
filed six police reports; all of which were directed at Boushie. Boushie,
¶ 4. After these Herculean efforts, Windsor took other steps he deemed
necessary to protect himself and his reputation against Boushie. In
turn, Boushie requested and was granted a TOP against Windsor in the
Missoula Municipal Court. Id.

This TOP, was eventually described by the district court as
having “vague and unintelligible prohibition[s],” (Doc. 150 at 8-9, 11),
barred Windsor from threatening to harm or harming
Boushie’s wife; harassing or otherwise contacting Boushie’s
wife or University of Montana Staff4; coming within 1,500
feet from Boushie’s residence, Boushie’s wife and the
University of Montana; and possessing a certain firearm. It
also required Windsor to release to
Boushie and to refrain from posting Boushie’s name on line.
Id. at ¶ 5. On September 17, 2013, “Boushie filed a request to affirm
and extend the order of protection in the District Court.” Boushie at ¶
6. For his part, Windsor “moved to vacate the TOP. He also moved for
discovery regarding a number of different things, including Boushie’s
mental health and online activities.” Id. These pleadings were also
filed in district court.

The district court “denied Windsor’s requests and, ultimately
affirmed the Municipal Court’s decision regarding the TOP.” Id at ¶7.
The district court also declared Windsor a “vexatious litigant.” Id at ¶
20. Finally, the district court then took the unusual and punitive step
4According to 2009 research, the University of Montana is by far
the top employer in the City of Missoula, employing approximately
3,651 employees.
b1d0-ea06-11de-b150-001cc4c002e0.html (last accessed 7/24/2017).
of issuing an injunction because of Windsor’s alleged
‘extraordinary abuse of the state judicial system by
repeatedly filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits
. . . .’ Accordingly, the [district] court enjoined Windsor from
filing any complaint or initiating any proceedings without
leave from the district court judge. The [district] court’s
order also provided that if the lawsuit or proceeding named
judges or court employees, Windsor had to tender a $50,000
bond sufficient to satisfy an award of sanctions.

Id. at ¶ 7. This Court correctly struck the district court’s condition that
Windsor post a bond. Id. at 21. However, this Court did uphold the
district court’s decision which upheld Boushie’s TOP against Windsor.
Upon remand, the case remained briefly in the municipal court before
Boushie removed the case to the district court. (Doc. 150 at 3).
On September 23, 2014, the district court set an evidentiary
hearing for December 8, 2014. The order contained no statement about
the August 23, 2013 TOP remaining in effect until the December
hearing. Additionally, the December evidentiary hearing never
occurred. In fact, no evidentiary hearing ever occurred. (Doc. 150 at 4).
The district court eventually dismissed the TOP on motion of Boushie.
On October 3, 2014, the state filed an Information charging
Windsor with five counts of violation of an order of protection. Because
these offenses stack, i.e., subsequent convictions result in increased
punishments; the final three counts were charged as felonies. (Doc. 3).
The Information alleged Windsor violated the TOP on or about the
following dates: May 4, 2014 (Count I); July 4, 2014 (Count II); October
2, 2014 (Count III)5; December 30, 2013 (Count IV); and February 6,
2014 (Count V). (Doc. 3).

The factual predicates of the allegations largely stemmed from
some of the absurd restrictions in the TOP. Count I alleged that
Windsor had “posted an article on his website,, authored by himself, which mention the
name ‘Sean Boushie’ three times.” (Doc. 151 at 2). Similarly, Count II
alleged that Windsor had posted an article on the same website that
mentioned Boushie’s name once. (Id). Count III alleged that Windsor
had not relinquished control of the website
Count IV alleged that Windsor violated the TOP by posting “Sean
Boushie’s name on Twitter. . . .” (Doc. 151 at 3). Finally, the Amended
5The state later amended the date on Count III from a single date
to a time spanning August 24, 2013 through October 2, 2014. (Doc.

Information alleged that Windsor had “emailed Claudia Denker-Eccles,
Associate Counsel for the University of Montana.” (Doc. 151 at 3).
Acting pro se6, Windsor filed a flurry of motions including motions
challenging the validity of the TOP and motions to dismiss the charges
against him. On October 29, 2015 the district court issued an order
dismissing Counts I and II (writing Boushie’s name on a website), and
Count IV (writing Boushie’s name on Twitter).

Windsor’s trial on the remaining two counts commenced on
January 5, 2016. As with the majority of the pre-trial proceedings,
Windsor represented himself during trial. (Doc. 185). The State was
represented by deputy county attorney Jennifer Clark. With Mrs.
Clark was Det. Chris Shermer, a member of the Missoula Police
Department. (Jan. 5, 2016, Tr. at 95)7 Det. Shermer was the lead
6Windsor was originally appointed a public defender, Christopher
Daly. Mr. Daly’s role eventually transitioned into that of stand-by
counsel. Finally, with Windsor’s and the district court’s permission,
Mr. Daly withdrew and Windsor proceeded pro se.
7The transcripts in this matter appear to be grouped and
paginated as a collection of hearings. For example, hearings from April
8, 2015, September 11, 2015, January 5, 2016, and January 6, 2016, are
grouped and paginated as one transcript. Hence, the pagination does
not match the page number for a specific date.

investigator in the case against Windsor. Det. Shermer was listed as a
witness for the State. (Doc. 114 at 2). Windsor also listed Det.
Shermer as a defense witness. (Doc. 169.2 at pg. 1). Unbeknownst to
Windsor, Det. Shermer had been disciplined in October 2010 by the
Missoula Police Department, for “failing to educate himself of the
relevant criminal statutes and by using illegal means of pursuing a
criminal offender.” (Appendix E). Det. Shermer did not testify at
Windsor’s trial but his presence was known to the jury, (Jan. 5, 2016,
Tr. at 95, 130), and he was represented as the lead agent in the case
against Windsor. Det. Shermer also interviewed Boushie in the course
of his investigation. (Jan. 5, 2016, Tr. at 216). Det. Shermer was also
subpoenaed by both the State, (Doc. 169), and his name appears on
Windsor’s witness list (169.2).

Windsor testified on his own behalf at trial. However, because he
was acting pro se and without the benefit of stand-by counsel, he
questioned himself on the witness stand in a question-and-answer
format. While this process seemed to work on direct, it allowed the
prosecution to run roughshod over Windsor’s rights on cross-
examination because his ability to make contemporaneous objections
was compromised. For example, on cross-examination the following
prejudicial colloquy occurred between State’s counsel and Windsor:
State: One of your contentions is that this court is corrupt,

Windsor: Yes.

State: But, in fact, this court actually dismissed three of the
charged counts.

Windsor: Yes. Three felonies.

(Jan. 6, 2016, Vol. I. at 22). A short time later, the prosecutor violated
Mont. R. Evid. 410 by questioning and eliciting testimony from Windsor
on his pre-trial attempts to settle the case. Although Windsor did not
object, the district court did not intervene to prevent an obvious error of
law on the part of the prosecutor. Further, when Windsor attempted to
address these settlement discussions in his closing argument, he was
prohibited from doing so upon objection by the State, despite the fact
that the State had elicited the testimony on cross-examination. (Jan. 6,
2016, Vol. I. at 67).

One of the pillars of Windsor’s defense was that he and Boushie
were also engaged in civil litigation and, as a result, Windsor was
required to serve certain legal documents on Boushie. Boushie’s TOP,
however, prevented Windsor from serving Boushie as required by the
Rules of Civil Procedure. One of Windsor’s arguments was that he had
mailed documents intended for Boushie to an attorney for the
University of Montana, Boushie’s employer. In his opening statement,
Windsor argued:

Some mail was sent to attorney Caudia Denker-Eccles.
At the time my thought was that the ex parte TOP had been
expired for months. I also thought that the ex parte TOP
would not and could not apply to something as vital as the
service of legal documents.

When you’re involved in a civil lawsuit with somebody,
you are required to send them a copy of everything that gets
filed with the court. If you change your address, you have to
– have to serve something. It has to be sent to them
otherwise your case can be dismissed because you didn’t do
it. It’s a – it’s a law. It’s a rule.

So how can somebody be stopped from their civil
litigation with a temporary order of protection issued on an
ex parte basis where I had no notice of it and didn’t even
have an opportunity to speak? I don’t believe you can.
I was confident that I was not violating the ex parte
TOP. I would have never sent anything if I thought it was a
violation.  (Jan. 5, 2016, Tr. 152-53).

Windsor’s proposed jury instructions also resounded with this
very theory of defense: he thought the TOP had expired and even if it
had not, he did not violate it by sending the paperwork to an attorney
working for Boushie’s employer. For example, Windsor’s proposed
instruction 13 reads, in part, “[w]hat a defendant was thinking and
what the defendant intended when the crime was committed matters.

The jury must differentiate between someone who did not mean to
commit a crime and someone who intentionally set out to commit a
crime.” (Appendix D at 28)8. Windsor also objected to what ultimately
became Instruction 15 allowing the jury to infer Windsor’s state of
mind from his actions and other facts. Windsor’s objection was “Better
definitions are provided for both knowingly and purposely.” (Appendix
D at 36). As better definitions, Windsor proposed result-based
definitions of both “knowingly” and “purposely.” (Appendix D at 37-56).
He even provided the district court with applicable legal authority
8Windsor’s proposed jury instructions incorporate lengthy legal
argument. For the Court’s convenience, Appendix D has been
paginated by counsel.

including citations to this Court’s decision in State v. Lambert, 280
Mont. 231, 929 P.2d 846 (1996). The district court denied Windsor’s
instructions and, instead, gave the conduct-based definitions of both
“purposely” and “knowingly.” (Doc 189).

In the end, the jury found Windsor guilty of both counts. (Jan. 6,
2016, Vol. I at 81). The district court sentenced Windsor to two sixmonth
sentences in the Missoula County jail; each sentence to run
consecutively to each other. The district court also imposed $2,000.00
in restitution to Boushie, a $1,000 fine, various fees, and prohibited
Windsor from having any contact with Boushie and his wife. As part of
this restriction, the district court ordered Windsor to take down “any
web site that you have that has Sean Boushie’s name on it. . . .” (Jan.
6, 2016, Vol. I at 96). This prohibition included Windsor from referring
to Boushie on any website. (Jan. 6, 2016, Vol. I at 99).

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the district court
then requested Windsor autograph a copy of Windsor’s “Wanted”
poster. Windsor replied that he “would be delighted.” (Jan. 6, 2016,
Vol. I at 100).


The offense of violating an order of protection requires a singular
result. In this case, the required definitions of “purposely” and
“knowingly” required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Windsor acted with either a conscious object to cause a violation of an
order of protection, or with an awareness that there was a high
probability that his conduct would cause a violation of an order of

Although Det. Shermer did not testify at trial, his presence and
the fruits of his investigation were material to the State’s case. The
evidence that he had been disciplined by his employer and had engaged
in potentially criminal activity was equally material to Windsor’s
defense. Given how Windsor conducted his trial, it is all-but certain
that, had the State disclosed this Brady/Giglio material, Windsor would
have called Det. Shermer to testify for the purpose of discrediting the
investigation and the State’s case.9 The material set forth in Appendix
G would have had a devastating effect on the State’s case, undermined
9Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1971).

the integrity of the investigation into Windsor, and reasonably would
have resulted in a different outcome at trial, especially in light of
Windsor’s repeated references to the corruption represented by his

The district court also erred in allowing the prosecutor to elicit
testimony from Windsor that he had been charged with felonies and
that he had entered into settlement discussions with the State.
Although Windsor was a pro se defendant and required to know the
rules of law and evidence, the district court has a corresponding
obligation to ensure the laws are followed and prosecutor does not take
advantage of the defendant’s ignorance.


This Court reviews jury instructions for abuse of discretion. State
v. Lacey, 2012 MT 52, ¶ 15, 364 Mont. 291, 272 P.3d 1288. “In
considering whether a district court has correctly instructed the jury in
a criminal case, we determine whether the instructions taken as a
whole fully and fairly instructed the jury on law applicable to the case.”
State v. Tellegen, 2013 MT 337, ¶ 5, 372 Mont. 454, 314 P.3d 902 (citing

State v. Hocter, 2011 MT 251, ¶ 14, 362 Mont. 215, 262 P.3d 1089).
Where, as in Windsor’s case, a defendant asserts the district court
misinterpreted the meaning and application of the mental state of the
offense, this Court reviews the district court’s interpretation or
application of the law to determine if such interpretation or application
was correct. State v. Lambert, 280 Mont. 231, 234, 929 P.2d 836, 848

“Alleged Brady violations are reviewed de novo.” United States v.
Brady, 67 F.3d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995). Typically, a district court’s
ruling on a motion for a mistrial is reviewed to determine whether the
district court abused its discretion. State v. Partin, 287 Mont. 12, 18,
951 P.2d 1002 (1996).

“In general, this Court does not address issues of prosecutorial
misconduct pertaining to a prosecutor’s statements not objected to at
trial. However, we may exercise our discretion and review such issues
under the plain error doctrine.” State v. Lawrence, 2016 MT 346, ¶ 6,
386 Mont. 86, 385 P.3d 968. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
“Once the doctrine is invoked, this Court’s review is grounded on our
‘inherent duty to interpret the constitution and to protect individual
rights set forth in the constitution.’” Id (quoting and citing State v.
Finley, 278 Mont. 126, 134, 915 P.2d 208, 213)).


I. Conduct versus Result Mental State Instructions
“It is a basic rule that the trial court’s instructions must cover
every issue or theory having support in the evidence.” State v. Thorton,
218 Mont. 317, 320, 708 P.2d 273, 276 (1985). Additionally, it is a trial
court’s independent duty to ensure the jury instructions in a criminal
case fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.
C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 485, p. 375 (3d ed.2000)
(“It is the duty of the trial judge to charge the jury on all essential
questions of law, whether requested or not”). “[T]he essence of a fair
trial is ensuring that the jury is provided the correct legal principles so
that it may reach the proper conclusion based on the law and the
evidence.” People v. Novak, 643 N.E.2d 762, 774 (Ill. 1994). “Jury
instructions serve an important role in trial. They guarantee decisions
consistent with the evidence and the law. . . .” State v. Andress, 2013
MT 12A, ¶ 14, 368 Mont. 248, 299 P.3d 316.

Here, although Windsor’s proposed instructions are neither a
model of brevity nor fashioned in a manner normally seen by trial
courts, they do adequately set forth the correct result-based definitions
for “knowingly” and “purposely.” This Court has instructed that
“[d]istrict courts should ‘grant wider latitude to pro se litigants’ as long
as that latitude does not prejudice the other party.” State v. Daniels,
2017 MT 163, ¶ 17, ___ Mont. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (quoting and citing
State v. Ferre, 2014 MT 96, ¶ 16, 374 Mont. 428, 322 P.3d 1047). Thus,
Windsor should not be expected to craft his instructions “with the
discrimination of an Oxford don,” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,
459 (1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted), providing that
both the State and the district court can determine the substance of the
proposed instruction.

In Windsor’s case, it was clear from well before trial that a main
portion of his defense was that he was faced with Hobson’s choice:
being required to serve Boushie with legal paperwork in other civil
litigation and a TOP with a scope that completely prohibited Windsor’s
ability to perform that service. Distilled, Windsor’s defense is that he
did not intend to violate the TOP because he had taken steps not to
serve Boushie directly, but legal counsel for Boushie’s employer. In
other words, Windsor took careful, reasoned steps to ensure that his
conduct did not cause the result of violating the TOP. Again, his
proposed instructions reflect both that reality and that theory of

Windsor voir dired jurors on the subject. He asked the venire “If I
tell you, as I will tell you, that I never intended to commit a crime,
would that cause you to doubt that I’m telling the truth? And we’ll
start with you [indicating to a member of the venire].” (Tr. at 120).
The potential juror answer, “Well, intent is a - - is a - - I don’t know
what you intend. I just know the resulting action. I wouldn’t know
what the intention is without some sort of story, and then I wouldn’t be
sure.” (Id). Windsor even tried to introduce exhibits which showed his
attempts to avoid sending anything to Boushie. “What [defendant’s
proposed exhibit 14) has to do with, all of those have to do with showing
mental state and the attempts to avoid sending anything directly to the
petition in this case who was - - Sean was a protected person.” (Tr. at
72). In his opening statement, Windsor argued, “There is a
requirement that you have to knowingly and purposefully do
something, and based on my reading of the case law relative to that it
means you have to have a guilty mind. You have to have an intent.
You have to have an intent that you are going to commit a crime.” (Tr
at 161). While not necessarily the correct legal language, Windsor is
advocating for a result-based theory of defense and relying on the
correct mental state instructions.

This Court is aware of the varying legal definitions of both
“purposely” and “knowingly” that appear in the pattern Montana
Criminal Jury Instructions and the accompanying caution that appears
in the comment section. Both the caution and this Court’s
jurisprudence make it very clear that it is error to give a jury all
possible definitions of “knowingly” and “purposely.” It is also error to
give the incorrect definitions. State v. Rothacher, 272 Mont. 303, 901
P.2d 82 (1995); State v. Lambert, 280 Mont. 231, 929 P.2d 846 (1996);
State v. Patton, 280 Mont. 278, 930 P.2d 635 (1996); State v. Johnston,
2010 MT 152, ¶ 9, 357 Mont. 46, 237 P.3d 70 (citing and quoting State
v. Azure, 2005 MT 328, ¶ 20, 329 Mont. 536, 125 P.3d 116).
Although the district court had previously described the TOP at
issue in this case as containing “vague and unintelligible prohibiton[s]”
(Doc. 150 at 8-9), the court instructed the jury that Windsor would have
the requisite mental state to violate the TOP if it was Windsor’s
“conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature.” (Doc. 189, Inst.

17). The court also instructed the jury that it could find Windsor acted
“knowingly” if the jury found Windsor was “aware of his conduct.”
(Doc. 189, Inst. 18). Both instructions undercut the state’s burden of
proof and are inconsistent with the requirements of the relevant
criminal statute. They were also inconsistent with Windsor’s theory of

Violating an order of protection is a result-based offense and
requires the result-based mental state. “A person commits the offense
of violation of an order of protection if the person, with knowledge of
the order, purposely or knowingly violates a provision of . . . an order of
(emphasis added). Time and time again, this Court has issued opinions
holding that when a criminal offense requires that a defendant act
“purposely” or “knowingly,” the district court is required to instruct the
jury on the definition of purposely and the definition of knowingly that
applies in the context of the particular crime.” Patton, 280 Mont. at
291, 930 P.2d at 643.

Where an offense criminalizes particularized conduct, the
court must instruct the jury with the “conduct-based”
definition, i.e., a person acts purposely when it is his conscious object to
engage in that conduct, and he acts knowingly when he is aware of his
conduct. See Lambert, 280 Mont. at 236, 929 P.2d at 849. Where,
however, an offense does not describe particularized conduct but
instead the result of conduct, then the court must instruct the jury with
the “result-based” definition, i.e., a person acts purposely when it is his
conscious object to cause that result, and he acts knowingly when he is
aware that it is highly probable that the specified result will be caused
by his conduct. Id.

The statute prohibiting violation of an order of protection does not
set forth particular conduct which, if engaged in, results in the
commission of the offense; rather, one “may engage in a wide variety of
conduct and still commit the offense.” Id. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-626
seeks to avoid the singular result of the violation of a protective order,
not the many forms of conduct that result in the violation. In light of
this statutory scheme, the district court erred in giving the “conductbased”
instructions. The effect of these instructions “was to alter the
State’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of
the offense.” Lambert, 280 Mont. at 237, 929 P.2d at 850. As this
Court has noted, “to prove that a defendant was aware of his conduct is
one thing; to prove that he was aware of the high probability of the
risks posed by his conduct is quite another.” Id.

As instructed in Windsor’s case, the state did not have to prove,
and the jury did not have to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Windsor intended to cause the result of violating the TOP, or that he
was aware of a high probability that his conduct would cause that
result. All the state had to prove and the jury had to find was that
Windsor was aware of his conduct, e.g., contacting an attorney for the
University of Montana. This is a much lower burden than proving he
intended to violate the TOP with that conduct.

In his own legally untrained way, Windsor presented the above
argument to the district court. Windsor primarily relied on State v.
Starr, 204 Mont. 210, 664 P.2d 893 (1983) to advocate for the result based
definitions of “purposely” and “knowingly.” While Starr is not as
on-point as cases like Johnston, Lambert, or Patton, it does address the
two necessary functions of a district court in selecting the appropriate
mens rea jury instructions. “Thus, two functions are performed in
analyzing the statute which describes an offense. First, determining
which mental state must be proved, and second, determining to which
of the four conditions or occurrences the mental states relate.” Starr,
204 Mont. at 221, 664 P.2d at 898. The four conditions referenced in
Starr are co-opted from a law review article upon which the Starr court

The Montana code uses only three classifications in
evaluating the defendant’s mental state: purposely,
knowingly, and negligently. These mental state
classifications are defined in relation to four objectively
measurable conditions or occurrences: conduct,
circumstances, facts, and result. However, all four criteria
do not apply to each mental state. ‘Purposely,’ which means
with a conscious objective, relates to conduct or result.

‘Knowingly,’ defined as ‘awareness,’ relates to conduct,
circumstances, facts or result.
Starr, 204 Mont. at 219, 664 P.2d at 898 (citing and quoting, J.
Essman, A Primer on Mental State in the Montana Criminal Code of
1973, 37 Mont. L. Rev. 401, 403-04 (1976)).

With Starr as authority, Windsor offered an instruction that
“purposely refers to the defendant’s objective or intended result.”
(Appendix D at 37). As for his proposed “knowingly” instruction,
Windsor proposed the following language: “A person acted knowingly if
he knew what he did was a crime, or there was a high probability that
his conduct would cause a crime.” (Appendix D at 48). He also argued
for instructing language reading “[t]o find the Defendant guilty in this
case, the State has to prove the Defendant was aware that his conduct
would violate an order of protection or that there was a high probability
that his conduct would violate an order of protection.” (Id). Windsor
was clearly advocating for the legally correct result-based definitions.
In fact, Windsor cited to the district court this Court’s opinions in
Johnston and State v. Azure, 2005 MT 328, ¶ 20, 329 Mont. 536, 125
P.3d 1116.

There is a great deal of chaff in Windsor’s proposed jury
instructions. Contained within, however, are the kernels of the mental
state instructions which fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case. The district court erred in not gleaning these
kernels and then giving the jury the correct mental state definitions of
“purposely” and “knowingly.” The district court had an obligation to
work a little harder to glean these kernels in Windsor’s instructions for
two reasons. First, because Windsor was pro se, the district court
should have extended Windsor wider latitude as long as it did not
prejudice the state. Second, Windsor actually presented the court with
the correct mental state instructions.

The district court abused its discretion in denying Windsor’s
instruction. When jury instructions were settled, the district court
started with the state’s jury instructions. While the state’s proposed
instructions are not found in the court record, the substance can be
ascertained from the discussion. When the court came to state’s
proposed mental state instructions 17 and 18, Windsor objected and
directed the court to his instructions in which he “provided a detailed
proposed instruction, along with extensive backup information, about
mens rea, actus rea. Purposely. When it’s the ‘person’s conscious object
to engage in conduct of that nature.’ If I’m a juror, it means nothing to
me.” (Tr. 298). The district court overruled Windsor’s objections
stating, “Well it’s the statutory definition, the language that’s in the
standard instructions, so it’s language that I’m aware the Montana
Supreme Court has approved.” (Id). Similarly, the court overruled
Windsor’s same objection to the State’s proposed definition of
“knowingly.” The court did, however, tell Windsor that it would look at
Windsor’s instruction after it had a chance to review them in greater
detail. (Tr. 302-03, 304).

After the Court had an opportunity to review Windsor’s proposed
instructions as well as the State’s objections to Windsor’s instructions,
the district court overruled all of Windsor’s objections by simply
“rely[ing] on the state’s notice of objections to defendant’s proposed jury
instructions, court document 172.” (Tr. 308). The state’s “Notice of
Objections to Defendant’s Proposed Jury Instructions” consisted of a
“spreadsheet of objections to Defendant’s proposed instructions.” (Doc.
172). Regarding Windsor’s proposed “purposely” instruction, the
State’s objection reads as follows: “D’s contains inaccurate statement of
law.” The spreadsheet contains the same objection to Windsor’s
“knowingly” instruction.

That is the sum total of the State’s objection.

The sum total of the district court’s exercise of discretion is reference to
the State’s objection in overruling Windsor’s instructions. “That a trial
court has a right to exercise its discretion does not mean a trial court
should not disclose the reasons underlying a discretionary act. Absent
these reasons, we as an appellate court, are left to guess as to why the
trial court made a particular decision.” State v. Stumpf, 187 Mont. 255,
226, 609 P.2d 298, 299 (1980). “[A] court’s failure to exercise its
discretion is, in itself, an abuse of discretion.” State v. Weaver, 276
Mont. 505, 509, 917 P.2d 437, 440 (1996).

Neither the State nor the district court elaborated on what
aspects of Windsor’s proposed “purposely” and “knowingly” instructions
each believed to be misstatements of law. Again, it is certainly true the
instructions contain extraneous material that may be legally incorrect.
However, the fact remains that Windsor’s proposed instructions at
their core presented the district court with the correct mental state
definitions. Nothing in the district courts rulings on either the State’s
proposed instructions or Windsor’s proposed instructions on the topic
evidence any consideration of whether Windsor’s crimes are conductbased
or result-based. Absent evidence of the exercise of this
discretion, or discussion as to why Windsor’s proposed instructions are
denied, this is an abuse of discretion by the district court.
Given the above, Windsor respectfully requests that this Court
conclude the district court erred in instructing the jury, vacate his
conviction, and remand the case to the appropriate court for a new

II. Due Process, Corruption, and Brady v. Maryland
The state violated Windsor’s due process rights in withholding
information pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Specifically, the state and its agency, the Missoula County Police
Department, withheld critical impeachment information on the lead
investigator in Windsor’s case, Det. Shermer. Although Det. Shermer
did not testify, he was listed on both parties’ witness lists, and his role
in Windsor’s case loomed large.

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d
215 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held “that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to
guilt or punishment. . . .” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Montana has adopted
the rationale of Brady. State v. Arlington, 265 Mont. 127, 151-152, 875
P.2d 307, 321-322 (1994). The United States Supreme Court has
broadened Brady to the point where a defendant’s failure to specifically
request does not alleviate the government or the State from its
obligation to disclose favorable evidence. United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976).

In Montana, a party seeking to establish a Brady violation must establish:

(1) the State possessed evidence, including impeachment
evidence, favorable to the defense; (2) the petitioner did not
possess the evidence not could he have obtained it with
reasonable diligence; (3) the prosecution suppressed the
favorable evidence; and (4) had the evidence been disclosed,
a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different.

State v. Giddings, 2009 MT 61, ¶ 48, 349 Mont. 347, 208 P.3d 363
(internal citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has
consistently held that the government “violates a defendant’s right to
due process if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and
material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.” Smith v. Cain, 565
U.S. 73, 75 (2012). “Evidence is ‘material’ within the meaning of Brady
when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Cone
v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-470 (2009). “A reasonable probability does
not mean the defendant ‘would more likely than not have received a
different verdict with the evidence,’ only that the likelihood of a
different result is great enough to ‘undermine confidence in the
outcome of the trial.’” Smith, 565 U.S. at 75 (citing and quoting Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). “The question is not whether the
defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. “A defendant need not demonstrate that after
discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed
evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict.” Kyles, 514
U.S. at 434-35.

After trial and sentencing, Windsor discovered that Det. Shermer
had been disciplined by the Missoula Police Department in October
2010 for “violating MPD policies.” (Appendix F). While this alone may
not constitute a Brady violation, it was the nature of Det. Shermer’s
violations that demonstrate a Brady violation occurred in Windsor’s
case. As noted in Appendix F, Det. Shermer had been in search of a
another defendant with an outstanding warrant. Det. Shermer had
reason to believe that defendant was in Billings. “Shermer contacted a
job service agency posing to be the wanted defendant and used the
personal identifiers known to him through [Shermer’s] access to the
[defendant’s] case file. After providing verifying information from the
file, Detective Shermer obtained the user name and password for the
defendant’s job service account and his last know address.”

In her letter to the Missoula Police Department, the Missoula
County Attorney’s Office acknowledges that, as a result of his actions,
Det. Shermer “must be placed on a Giglio/Brady list, which will
negatively impact his ability to perform his duties as a witness in our
cases.” (Appendix F).   (CLICK HERE TO READ LETTER)

Although the county attorney’s letter indicates that it did not
learn of Det. Shermer’s discipline until late June 2016, after Windsor’s
trial and sentencing, the county attorney does address her obligations
under Kyles which, in the words of the county attorney, “imposed upon
the prosecutor an affirmative ‘duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government’s behalf, including the
police,’ and a resulting duty to disclose that evidence to the defense.”
(Appendix F) (citing and quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 419). The county
attorney acknowledges that her “office will now have to go back and
notify every defendant who has been convicted in a case investigated by
Detective Shermer since October, 2010 of these findings. This will
inevitably lead to post-conviction litigation in many cases.” (Appendix
F) (emphasis added).

Det. Shermer was the lead investigator in Windsor’s case, and the
material included in Appendix F should have been discovered and
disclosed by the state. During trial, the state informed the court that
“Detective Shermer verified that the web site []
was still active after the order of protection had been issued.” (Tr. 54).
That the site was still active, this formed the basis of one of the
charges against Windsor. Det. Shermer was present during trial and
was introduced to the jury at the beginning of trial. (Tr. 92). Members
of the venire knew Det. Shermer. (Tr. 95). In his cross-examination of
Boushie, Windsor asked Boushie if he had lied to Det. Shermer. (Tr.
216). Finally, Det. Shermer was the only named law enforcement
officer appearing numerous times on the State’s Affidavit and Motion
for Leave to file Information because Det. Shermer took the original
complaint from Boushie. (Doc. 1)

For better or for worse, Windsor maintained in his closing
argument that Montana was “the most corrupt state in the country.”
(Jan. 6, 2016, Vol. I at 33). Prior to trial, he had also made a film
proclaiming this sentiment. As part of his zealous attempt to represent
himself pro se, Windsor had even filed a request to depose Det.
Shermer and subpoena documents from him. (Doc. 70). The district
court denied this request because the state “agreed it would make these
witnesses avail. for interview by Defendant.” (Doc. 70 at 1). It is
unknown whether Windsor ever interviewed Det. Shermer, but given
Windsor’s zeal and attempts to weed out corruption, had he know of the
information contained in Appendix F, he most certainly would have
used it. Windsor did allege that he met with the State’s attorney and
Det. Shermer regarding this case on August 17, 2015. (Doc. 92 at 2).
Windsor also argued that “Chris Shermer never contacted the
Defendant or anyone other than Sean Boushie and the University of
Montana about these charges. None of these people has any knowledge
about what the defendant did ‘knowingly and purposely’ or otherwise,
so they must not be allowed to testify that they do.” (Doc. 96 at 10).
Finally, in pretrial motions, Windsor argued, “William M. Windsor
must be allowed to introduce character evidence regarding Sean
Boushie and Chris Shermer. Both are liars, and evidence must be
presented.” (Doc. 97 at 5). This statement was made in a Response to
the State’s First Motions in Limine.

Windsor’s pretrial pleadings repeatedly accuse Det. Shermer of
threatening Windsor with a federal offense, lying, and mocking him.
The evidence in Appendix F was certainly material to Windsor’s theory
of defense and his case in chief. (Doc. 98 and Ex. A, thereto). That Det.
Shermer did not end up testifying at trial does not make the
Brady/Giglio information contained in Appendix F any less material.
In fact, according to this Court’s decision in State v. Weisbarth, 2016
Mont. 214, 384 Mont. 424, 378 P.3d 1195, the fact that Det. Shermer
did not testify may make the information more material.

In Weisbarth, this court addressed a Brady violation in the form
of medical records for an alleged child victim. After a specific request
for the records, the defense was presented with a heavily redacted
version of the documents. Weisbarth, ¶¶ 1-6. The redacted material
“contained evidence that was clearly favorable to the defense. . . .”
Weisbarth, ¶ 1. One of the reasons that the material was favorable was
because it was plain from the record that it was “relevant to the
defense’s trial strategy.” Weisbarth, ¶ 3. On appeal, the State raised a
number of arguments against Weisbarth’s Brady argument, all of
which were dismissed by this Court.

One of the state’s arguments was that “for the purposes of Brady,
inadmissible evidence cannot be considered favorable evidence because
it cannot be used by the defense at trial.” Weisbarth, ¶ 23. This Court
agreed “with the majority of courts that have addressed the issue. The
focus of the inquiry should not be on whether the evidence is admissible
or inadmissible, but whether the evidence is favorable to the defense
and could have affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Weisbarth, ¶
24. This Court properly noted the need for the material at both a trial
and pre-trial stage. The latter is especially critical because it affects
both defense strategy and investigation.

We decline to develop a rule that would foreclose the
development of defense strategy and investigation or to
presuppose what information the defense may have
developed as a result of properly disclosed evidence. In light
of the policy underlying Brady, we believe that even
inadmissible evidence could have ‘substantial value to the
defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed.’
Weisbarth, ¶ 24 (citing and quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110). The
material contained in Appendix F would have been critical to both
Windsor’s defense strategy and investigation and thus should have
been disclosed to him.

A second argument rebuffed by this Court in Weisbarth was that
Weisbarth could have obtained the exculpatory evidence through the
exercise of reasonable diligence. Weisbarth, ¶ 29. While this Court
acknowledged that its Brady requirement “is now seemingly at odds
with that of the Ninth Circuit,” it declined to address the conflict and
concluded that Weisbarth had exercised diligence in his quest for the
medical records. Weisbarth, ¶ 30 (citing and quoting Amando v.
Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014)). “Here, Weisbarth had
no way of knowing what evidence the medical records contained and he
did the only thing he could do to obtain the records by filing a motion
with the District Court requesting their disclosure.” Weisbarth, ¶ 30.
Although he did not have defense counsel for the lion’s share of
his case, Windsor exercised a similar diligence to Weisbarth. Windsor
filed numerous motions for the production of documents, requests for
depositions, interviews, and records. On May 1, 2015, while still in
custody, Windsor filed a “Motion Regarding Discovery.” (Doc. 38). In
this motion Windsor sought “approval of the Court to take depositions
by video and telephone” of the witnesses against him. One of these
witnesses was Det. Shermer. (Doc. 3 at 3). Windsor made a specific
request for the court to issue subpoenas for depositions with document
production to all of the witnesses named in the State’s Information.
(Doc. 70). Among those witnesses was Det. Shermer. In his request,
Windsor attached an exhibit detailing the documents he wanted
produced by Det. Shermer. The documents requested included “All
documents relating or referring to, or evidencing, reflecting or
constituting your job application with the Missoula Police Department.”
(Doc. 70, Request for Deposition of Chris Shermer, Ex. at 4)10.
Notwithstanding the county attorney’s own concession that her office
had an affirmative obligation to obtain Det. Shermer’s disciplinary
record and disclose it, Windsor’s request for deposition and document
production is a reasonable exercise of diligence for one unschooled in
the law and discovery requests. In short: Windsor exercised reasonable
diligence in attempting to obtain the exculpatory and impeachment
material contained in Appendix F.

Windsor’s case establishes not one but all of the necessary
10This document can be found at page 898 of the 2,488 page
combined district court record.
requirements for a Brady violation. As a result, a new trial is the
appropriate remedy. “[O]nce a court finds a Brady violation, a new
trial follows as the prescribed remedy, not as a matter of discretion.”
United States v. Oruche, 484 F.3d 590, 595-96 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
III. District Court Error and the Right to a Fair Trial

Twice during her cross-examination of Windsor, the prosecutor
asked Windsor impermissible questions which violated his right to a
fair trial as they were clearly impermissible and prejudicial. However,
at the time of the questions, Windsor was his own counsel and a
witness; therefore, he was both unable to register an objection to the
questions and unaware that he had to register an objection.
The state’s cross-examination of Windsor featured the following
two exchanges.

State: One of your contentions is that this court is corrupt, correct?

Windsor: Yes.

State: But, in fact, this court actually dismissed three of the charged counts.

Windsor: Yes. Three felonies.

(Jan. 6, 2016, Vol. I. at 22).
. . . .
State: Well, you and I discussed resolution of this case, correct?

Windsor: You offered to settle several times.

State: You did not want to do that, correct?

Windsor: I said that if you wanted to dismiss the charges, I would agree.

State: And I offered to dismiss those charges, correct?

Windsor: With strings attached, yes.

State: Because all I told you I wanted out of this case was for you to leave Mr. Boushie alone.

(Jan. 6, 2016, Vol. I. at 26-27).

Both exchanges violated Windsor’s right to a fair trial and Rule
410 of the Montana Rules of Evidence. Rule 410 reads in relevant part:
Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of
nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo
contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of
statements made in connection with any of the foregoing
pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal
action, case or proceedings against the person who made the
plea or offer.

It is prosecutorial misconduct to tell a jury of offers to plead guilty or
settlement offers. See State v. Sha, 292 Minn. 182, 193 N.W.2d 829
(Minn. 1963) (ordering a new trial when prosecutor elicited testimony
that defendant said he wanted to plead guilty). Here, although
Windsor had not offered to plead guilty, the prosecutor’s questioning
still violated Rule 410 because they revealed “statements made in
connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers.” Mont. R. Evid.

The prosecutor similarly erred in eliciting testimony from
Windsor that he had been charged with three felonies that the district
court had dismissed. Such testimony invites unwarranted speculation
in the minds of jurors and impermissibly invites speculation on the
defendant’s potential punishment. State v. Zuidema, 157 Mont. 367,
373-74, 485 P.2d 952, 955 (1971). “[P]roviding jurors sentencing
information invites them to ponder matters that are not within their
province, distracts them from their fact finding responsibilities, and
creates a strong possibility of confusion.” State v. E.M.R., 2013 MT 3, ¶
24, 368 Mont. 179, 292 P.3d 451 (citing Shannon v. United States, 512
U.S. 573, 579, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2424, 129 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1994)).

This Court has held that “one accused of a crime is entitled to
have guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence
introduced at trial, not on the grounds of official suspicion, indictment,
continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.
. . .” State v. Williams, 184 Mont. 111, 113, 601 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1979)
(quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-85, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 1934-
35, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1978)). Here, the State elicited testimony from
Windsor that the Court had dismissed three felonies. The question was
objectionable, and the answer permitted the jury to speculate on why
the charges where dismissed, the severity of the charges remaining,
and what the previous felonies might have been.

It is also not beyond reason that a juror may have speculated that
Windsor had his previous felony charges dropped on some type of legal
technicality, thus triggering that juror’s desire to balance the scales or
convict Windsor of something. This logic is simply an extension of why
jurors are often precluded from learning of a defendant’s prior
convictions or previous allegations. “Unfair prejudice can arise from
evidence that arouses the jury’s hostility or sympathy for one side
without regard to its probative value.” State v. Bieber, 2007 MT 262, ¶
59, 339 Mont. 309, 170 P.3d 444. Similarly, it is also why courts
disallow evidence that a defendant has been previously acquitted of a
serious crime. See e.g., Blackburn v. Cross, 510 F.2d 1014, 1019 (5th
Cir. 1975) (although evidence of guilt was “quite convincing,” admission
of testimony that the appellant committed a prior crime for which
appellate was acquitted was not harmless error).

The reality is that, other than the jurors, Windsor was the least
legally educated individual at his trial. Had he been represented by
competent counsel, that counsel would have known to object to these
questions and to request a mistrial when the prosecution introduced
evidence that Windsor’s prior felony charges had been dismissed. Even
if the prosecutor wades into these prejudicial waters hoping to take
advantage of Windsor’s legal skill, it was the district court’s obligation
to stop the prosecutor and ensure Windsor received a fair trial. State v.
Griffin, 2016 MT 231, ¶ 9, 385 Mont. 1, 386 P.3d 559 (“A criminal
defendant has a right to a fair trial under both the United States and
Montana Constitutions. The district court’s bears the duty to insure
that the defendant receives a fair trial.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).

Given Windsor’s lack of legal training, the prosecutor’s comments,
and the district court’s failure to intervene, Windsor’s right to a fair
trial was violated, and he respectfully requests this Court reverse his
conviction and remand his case for a new trial.


Given the events at trial including problems with jury
instructions and improper questioning, as well as the subsequently
discovered Brady material, it is clear that Windsor’s conviction stands,
at best, on shaky ground. Given the totality of these errors, this Court
can have no confidence in the validity of the jury’s verdict. Therefore,
Windsor respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand his
case to the appropriate court for a new and fair trial.

Respectfully submitted this 26th day of July, 2017.
/s/ Colin M. Stephens
Colin M. Stephens
Attorney for Windsor "

Dated this 26th day of July, 2017.

/s/ Colin M. Stephens
Colin M. Stephens
Attorney for Appellant

I, Colin M. Stephens, hereby certify that I have served true and accurate copies of the foregoing
Brief - Appellant's Opening to the following on 07-26-2017:

Timothy Charles Fox (Prosecutor)
Montana Attorney General
215 North Sanders
PO Box 201401
Helena MT 59620
Representing: State of Montana

Kirsten H. Pabst (Prosecutor)
200 W. Broadway
Missoula MT 59802
Representing: State of Montana

Chad M. Wright (Attorney)
Representing: William M. Windsor
Service Method: eService
Electronically Signed By: Colin M. Stephens
Dated: 07-26-2017  "

Source and Full Document as Filed

Pabst Letter,