Monday, September 25, 2017

Exo-Geo Political Round Table with Cobra, Benjamin Fulford and Kauilapele

 "Hosts Louisa and Steve welcome COBRA, Benjamin Fulford and Kauilapele for An Exo/Geo Politics Round Table: Uniting the Light- Planetary Situation.

This intriguing exchange includes discussion about the current status of the power players on the world stage and the real cause for the delay in the transition of the financial system and planetary liberation overall. Kauilapele describes his mission work and the energetic changes and transition we are all experiencing and clearing.

Benjamin provides his unique insider and journalistic perspective to issues in the USA, North Korea, Japan, Vatican, Dragons, financial insight and more and COBRA bridges those two worlds together in a unique and eloquent way through the efforts of the Resistance Movement and Secret Space Program efforts that are working toward Planetary liberation and resolution of this current hostage status on earth.

COBRA also discusses the major solar and weather events that are happening on earth, and they ultimately represent, and much more. They all end with messages of positive change and hope for humanity.

To subscribe to Benjamin’s weekly newsletters please visit

To learn more about COBRA and The Resistance Movement visit

To follow Kauilapele’s Blog and Energy Reports visit

To receive notifications of our Reports you can subscribe to our YouTube Channel, follow us on Twitter at @ReportGoldfish, you can also follow us and like us on our 24/7 research news page at and to help support these and other programs please visit to make a donation and also you can make a donation to the links posted above. Thank you for your support and Thank you for viewing!"

Source and MORE,%20Benjamin%20Fulford%20and%20Kauilapele

Saturday, September 2, 2017

Those who can see, simply see

"Aug Tellez – It’s a system that wipes the memory and alters the genetic signature in a way that creates the impression of nativity to this universe which is not a universe but a created system maintained through technological control and spiritual-mental oppression or mind-control.

This is like waking up to find evidence that people are incapable of leaving this place. 

We’ve been here ‘forever’. Then it’s seen that this is simply because people are stuck in the native realm they belong to, or are created in.

So then we are faced with the concept that we are ‘created’ within this closed loop system and thus are a product of that system, like cartoon characters in a cartoon and therefore cannot leave the TV or even the theme of the cartoon world.

Then to try and achieve separation, people place themselves into a different context, a different environment based on their own interaction and behavior yet the system then, intelligently, almost magically, bends the laws of itself to re-wrap itself around the new behavior and perspective of the fleeing individual.

This is as if people build a new life and the false-reality then closes back in on the new as if to devour that which seeks separation.

This process continues in a never-ending chasing of the tail, a regurgitating and re-swallowing of the whole by the portion. 

This is impossible.

People are the fuel that is required to first exist from outside this system, in order for the system to have something to chase.

The trick is in the labyrinth, the cleverness of the mind-control. This is what is not easily conveyed here because of the non-linearity of time, the reflexivity of meaning and the nature of consciousness as an interplay of shadows and depth, contrast and outline.

Largely illusory, the very nature of all awareness here merely feeds into the platform for deception. Never the less, the descriptions continue.

The trick is when the system that is supposed to be chasing us, convinces us that we are supposed to be chasing it, and this is by disguising itself as the salvation, the exit port, the true reality.

This is known as the “False Awakening” and is one of the primary functions of the “9 Veils” which is a system designed to test and probe the human consciousness for wakefulness or higher awareness of what’s happening and then redirect that consciousness into that previously described chasing of the tail false-reality construct. 

This is used as fuel, nourishment, data for a system that is primarily technologically sourced and requires such information to provide meaning and direction or function.

Without the meaning, there is no function. Thus, the meaning must be derived some way, but how would such a system derive meaning?

How would a system make sense of the situation and in what priority would human feeling and self-awareness be placed?

This is the nature of the control system. 

An uncaring, logically thinking, primal directive mind-force seeking to utilize the biological material and the information and energy generated as its own private fuel source.

Back to the analogy, this is like that system which one wakes up to, only to see evidence of being forever and entirely born within. Even though it is false, it seeks to become the progenitor, the source of reason, the beginning and the end of time and space.

A more in depth, vicarious perspective is to imagine attempting to move outside the electromagnetic boundary of something which then stretches its magnetic walls like a rubber-band and then snaps forward a few feet to re-wrap you in its parameters. This happens, but not physically, with the concepts in your MIND.

The very ideas and notions of SELF, the direction of THINKING and TIME. Every layer that collapses and yields the exposed underlying truth of the deception, that layer moves to the outer edge while the next layer up moves forwards.

This was first discussed during my very first public unveiling where I attempt to describe how this system uses electromagnetic, algorithmic, geometric and conceptual control parameters to literally contain the mind within a false-reality construct based on layers of perception and replicated awareness.

This system recreates what it thinks you should be thinking about in order to keep consciousness contained within its domain. 

Think about how it would have to alter its patterns to then appear to be what you want to think about if you realized this game and began thinking about concepts related to outsmarting the system.

THAT is how ADVANCED this has become. It literally MAPPED OUT all possible behavior patterns and keeps people in these closed circuit loops and these last not for years, but for centuries and millennia continually. This has been happening for hundreds of thousands of years.

So as a person attempts to move outside the box which just positioned itself around them as their “true reality”, they discover it’s a hypercube which then reflexively expands its walls and then recollapses in a new position where they attempted to separate from the system. This is an intelligent system that runs on a program that mimics thoughts and recreates itself accordingly.

Here’s the catch, the system has built in flaws that cannot be corrected without destroying the entire system.

If people increase their awareness to the point where they can attain and understanding of all the fundamental tricks that this system uses and the illusions and susceptibilities of consciousness and the perceptual faculties then the individual gains the capacity to TRICK THE SYSTEM.

One effectively moves outside the parameters of the false self by letting go of ego, without ego, there are no viable control parameters for the system to work with. 

One’s own mind becomes a self-referential, higher-dimensional fractal that can maximize beyond the system’s input/output capacity and effectively overload the processing components.

This was discovered in the bases and is part of the remedy to this situation.

More can be said on this, I am preparing a soft-disclosure post which touches on a film which is actually one of the many that were examined in the unacknowledged special access programs. These films are used to expose what has happened and prepare the people as well as for those who are unable to see. Those who can see, simply see!"


Monday, August 7, 2017

Attorney Marc Randazza is a Gang Stalking Online expert indeed. He works with gangs of attorneys that harass people online and RUIN lives.I notified the courts, the authorities, the FBI long ago.

When Marc Randazza does not agree with your "content" he simply gets an UNCONSTITUTIONAL TRO to Suppress your Speech. Marc Randazza Simply gets Godaddy, Google, and the Courts to take your websites, steal your domain names and simply remove you from the search engines. He takes your domain names and websites and redirects them to his blog page defaming you.

When you Speak Critical of Marc Randazza he gets his gang stalking attorneys (internet trolls) to stalk you, to post hate about you, to threaten you physical harm, to ruin your business friendships and life in general and they do this for years on end. Some of their victims kill themselves, and they press them to do it.

Marc Randazza will NOT allow you to speak critical of him. Well and go on about your life that is. His gang stalking trolls are mostly attorneys, so they post in law magazines, they file amicus briefs in federal court, they conspire with attorneys in any case you may be in, they network at every level to discredit you, meanwhile they text you and threaten and intimidate you constantly.

Marc Randazza will sue you so he can get phone numbers you called, your bank information and depose family, friends and clients and stalk you some more with all that knowledge.

These gang stalkers including attorneys, law websites, and lot's more, well they have "clout" you see, and they go on Fox news, NPR, and interview with FORBES and they make sure to ruin YOUR LIFE with lies, as the scumbag gang stalking attorney is taken "SERIOUS" and you are simply "Dismissed".

I am Glad to here about the latest case Monica Foster talks about in the video below. I pray this will shed a whole lot of LIGHT and "Crystal Clear" precedent.

Also Check Out the Randazza vs. Cox case in Nevada, some of the motions discuss the TRO and how Marc Randazza deals with Free Speech he does not like.  ALL the blogs, websites, domain names in Marc's complaint and more intellectual property was simply TAKEN by Marc Randazza. No Trial, no Jury, no Judgement, just an Unconstitutional TRO. Check it out.

Click Below to Read my Complaint against Marc Randazza and the Gang, to the best of my Pro Se ability to fight back

Emotional Distress, Invasion of Privacy, and Intimidation. Incite Hate and Stalking. This is EXACTLY what Marc Randazza and his gang stalking attorneys do. They also use so called "credible" outlets to trash who they don't like or agree with or who will not do as they say. They did it to ME, they did to Monica Foster / Alexandra Mayers and countless others. This legal action is AMAZING. Of course Marc is representing the guy, if the guy loses Marc and his buddies lose the ONLY way they win case, by gang stalking harassing those in the cases they want to LOSE so they can set a precedent for THEMSELVES.

Thank you Alexandra Mayers for your continued work in shedding light on this VERY important Issue that has harmed so many.

Alexandra Mayers LIVE: 
Does the lawyer defending neo-nazi troll Andrew Anglin know where he is?

Saturday, August 5, 2017

Eliot Bernstein Deposition in Estate of Simon Bernstein West Palm Florida Sept 22, 2014 with Florida attorney Alan B. Rose of Mrachek Law Deposer

July 26, 2017 Fourth District Appeal: Linda W. BOTTA, Bethany B. BOYD, Nancy D. COLACHICCO, Appellants v. CIKLIN, LUBITZ & O’CONNELL and BRIAN M. O’CONNELL, ESQ., individually.


Linda W. BOTTA, Bethany B. BOYD, Nancy D. COLACHICCO, Appellants,


CIKLIN, LUBITZ & O’CONNELL, a Partnership of Professional
Associations, and BRIAN M. O’CONNELL, ESQ., individually,

No. 4D17-379
July 26, 2017

Appeal of non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Carlos A. Rodriguez, Judge; L.T. Case
No. CACE15019284AXXXCE.

Michael C. Sasso and Michael A. Sasso of Sasso & Sasso, Winter Park,
for appellants.

Brian M. O’Connell, Ashley Crispin Ackal, and Zachary Rothman of
Ciklin Lubitz & O’Connell, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

"The appellant daughters appeal from the circuit court’s order denying
their amended motion to transfer the underlying actions from Broward
County to Seminole County based on forum non conveniens. The
daughters argue the court erred because their evidence showed that
Broward County was not a convenient forum while Seminole County was
the most convenient forum. We agree with the daughters’ argument. We
reverse and remand for transfer of all pending actions to Seminole County."

"The law firm, as the drafter of the 2002 POA, filed an action in Broward
County seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2002 POA was valid as
“freely and voluntarily executed” by the mother, with “the requisite
capacity” and “free from duress, coercion and undue influence.” The law
firm named all three daughters as defendants.

The law firm alleged that daughter Botta resided in Connecticut, daughter Boyd resided in Broward
County, and daughter Colachicco resided in Seminole County.

The law firm alleged that it named all three daughters as defendants to the action based on their “antagonistic and adverse interests.”

"However, by the time the law firm filed its lawsuit, the three daughters
had resolved their differences. Daughters Botta and Boyd then filed a
malpractice counterclaim/third-party complaint against the law firm and
the attorney who drafted the POAs. 
Botta and Boyd claimed to be intended third party beneficiaries of the law firm’s and the attorney’s services for their mother. According to Botta and Boyd, but for the law firm’s and the attorney’s drafting of the 2002 POA, they would have withheld their consent to certain expenditures if they retained the “veto” power of the 2000 POA, and the removal of the “veto” power in the 2002 POA was the proximate cause of losses to them.

The three daughters also united to file an amended motion to transfer
venue from Broward County to Seminole County. In their motion and
affidavits, they alleged the following. Daughters Boyd and Colachicco
reside in Seminole County, more than 200 miles from Broward County.
Daughter Botta resides in Brevard County, more than 135 miles from
Broward County. Round trip travel for all three daughters would require
several hours and would be extremely inconvenient. The mother resided
in Seminole County when she executed the 2002 POA. The mother’s
affairs were managed in Seminole County until she died. The mother’s
estate was in probate in Seminole County. Any property being probated
was in Seminole County. No connection existed to Broward County."

"As for daughters Botta’s and Boyd’s malpractice action against the law
firm and the attorney, the daughters argued that action accrued not where
the legal services were provided in Palm Beach County,"

Brian O'Connell is one of a Gang of Co-Conspirating attorneys and Judges who put families against each other for their own financial gain, as far as I see it, because I can READ.

Brian O'Connell  and Ashley Crispin have a CLEAR Pattern and History and I believe a civil and criminal RICO and Racketeering Complaint will be NEXT up and include the whole GANG.

eMail me any tip you have about the law "practices" of Brian O'Connell
 and / or  Ashley Crispin of CIKLIN, LUBITZ & O’CONNELL 

South Florida Probate Court, 4th D.C.A, Florida Guardianship, Ted Bernstein, Attorney Alan Rose, Judge Marin Colin, Judge John Philips, Florida Corruption, Florida Predatory Guardianship, 

Tuesday, August 1, 2017

Bill Windsor Anti-Corruption Warrior of Lawless America Files Appeal and Continues Seeking Justice in the State of Montana. Where are the State and Federal Authorities ?

Supreme Court No. DA 16-0138 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Defendant and Appellant.


On Appeal from the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court,
Missoula County, the Hon. James A. Haynes, Presiding

Smith & Stephens, P.C. Montana Attorney General

Attorney for Defendant KIRSTEN PABST
& Appellant Missoula County Attorney
200 W. Broadway
Missoula, MT 59802
Attorneys for Plaintiff
& Appellee

District Court Judge for the Twenty-First Judicial District, sitting by designation.
Case Number: DA 16-0138


William M. Windsor (Windsor) appeals from his convictions of two
counts of Violation of an Order of Protection (both misdemeanors) and
the sentences imposed thereon. (Appendix A).


The district court erred in denying Windsor’s “result” definitions
of “knowingly” and “purposely.”

The State violated Windsor’s due process rights in withholding
information pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
The district court committed plain error in allowing the
prosecutor to question Windsor on whether he had been previously
charged with felonies, and whether Windsor had offered to settle the
case prior to trial, both of which amount to prosecutorial misconduct.


Through a very strange series of events, Windsor – then living in
Georgia – and Sean Boushie (Boushie), an employee at the University
of Montana, began to engage in a war of words over the internet. The
war culminated in Windsor traveling to Montana to obtain a temporary
order of protection against Boushie for cyber-stalking,

Boushie obtaining a Temporary Order of Protection (TOP) against Windsor, and
Windsor eventually being charged with felonies for violating the TOP.
Three of the five charges were eventually dismissed by the district
court on the grounds that some of the critical terms of the TOP
contained “vague and unintelligible prohibition[s]

11). The remaining two counts were misdemeanors. Windsor’s case
proceeded to trial, and he was ultimately convicted by a jury and
sentenced to two consecutive six-month sentences, all of which was
suspended except for 134 days which Windsor had already served.
(Doc. 201 at 2). The district court, which retained control of the case
despite the reduction of the offenses from felonies to misdemeanors,
also imposed a number of conditions and financial obligations which
will be addressed in further detail.

This is not Windsor’s first trip to this Court. He has filed several
pro se appeals related to the denial of his own request for restraining
2Windsor’s request was denied by the Missoula Municipal Court
on Aug. 6, 2016.

orders and orders of protection against Boushie. See: Windsor v. Fourth
Judicial Dist., 2014 MT 52N, 374 Mont. 542, 2013 Mont. LEXIS 575
(OP 13-0697); Windsor v. Boushie, 2014 MT 53N, 374 Mont. 542;
Windsor v. Missoula Muni. Court, 375 Mont. 551, 346 P.3d 1132 (OP
14-0173). In each of these cases, this Court denied relief to Windsor.
Boushie was more successful. In Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT
153, 375 Mont. 301, 328 P.3d 631 (hereafter Boushie I), this Court
upheld the TOP Boushie obtained against Windsor. Because this TOP
ultimately became the foundation for the criminal conviction from
which this appeal is taken, the procedural history of the TOP is

Windsor sought four separate petitions for protective orders and
filed six police reports; all of which were directed at Boushie. Boushie,
¶ 4. After these Herculean efforts, Windsor took other steps he deemed
necessary to protect himself and his reputation against Boushie. In
turn, Boushie requested and was granted a TOP against Windsor in the
Missoula Municipal Court. Id.

This TOP, was eventually described by the district court as
having “vague and unintelligible prohibition[s],” (Doc. 150 at 8-9, 11),
barred Windsor from threatening to harm or harming
Boushie’s wife; harassing or otherwise contacting Boushie’s
wife or University of Montana Staff4; coming within 1,500
feet from Boushie’s residence, Boushie’s wife and the
University of Montana; and possessing a certain firearm. It
also required Windsor to release to
Boushie and to refrain from posting Boushie’s name on line.
Id. at ¶ 5. On September 17, 2013, “Boushie filed a request to affirm
and extend the order of protection in the District Court.” Boushie at ¶
6. For his part, Windsor “moved to vacate the TOP. He also moved for
discovery regarding a number of different things, including Boushie’s
mental health and online activities.” Id. These pleadings were also
filed in district court.

The district court “denied Windsor’s requests and, ultimately
affirmed the Municipal Court’s decision regarding the TOP.” Id at ¶7.
The district court also declared Windsor a “vexatious litigant.” Id at ¶
20. Finally, the district court then took the unusual and punitive step
4According to 2009 research, the University of Montana is by far
the top employer in the City of Missoula, employing approximately
3,651 employees.
b1d0-ea06-11de-b150-001cc4c002e0.html (last accessed 7/24/2017).
of issuing an injunction because of Windsor’s alleged
‘extraordinary abuse of the state judicial system by
repeatedly filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits
. . . .’ Accordingly, the [district] court enjoined Windsor from
filing any complaint or initiating any proceedings without
leave from the district court judge. The [district] court’s
order also provided that if the lawsuit or proceeding named
judges or court employees, Windsor had to tender a $50,000
bond sufficient to satisfy an award of sanctions.

Id. at ¶ 7. This Court correctly struck the district court’s condition that
Windsor post a bond. Id. at 21. However, this Court did uphold the
district court’s decision which upheld Boushie’s TOP against Windsor.
Upon remand, the case remained briefly in the municipal court before
Boushie removed the case to the district court. (Doc. 150 at 3).
On September 23, 2014, the district court set an evidentiary
hearing for December 8, 2014. The order contained no statement about
the August 23, 2013 TOP remaining in effect until the December
hearing. Additionally, the December evidentiary hearing never
occurred. In fact, no evidentiary hearing ever occurred. (Doc. 150 at 4).
The district court eventually dismissed the TOP on motion of Boushie.
On October 3, 2014, the state filed an Information charging
Windsor with five counts of violation of an order of protection. Because
these offenses stack, i.e., subsequent convictions result in increased
punishments; the final three counts were charged as felonies. (Doc. 3).
The Information alleged Windsor violated the TOP on or about the
following dates: May 4, 2014 (Count I); July 4, 2014 (Count II); October
2, 2014 (Count III)5; December 30, 2013 (Count IV); and February 6,
2014 (Count V). (Doc. 3).

The factual predicates of the allegations largely stemmed from
some of the absurd restrictions in the TOP. Count I alleged that
Windsor had “posted an article on his website,, authored by himself, which mention the
name ‘Sean Boushie’ three times.” (Doc. 151 at 2). Similarly, Count II
alleged that Windsor had posted an article on the same website that
mentioned Boushie’s name once. (Id). Count III alleged that Windsor
had not relinquished control of the website
Count IV alleged that Windsor violated the TOP by posting “Sean
Boushie’s name on Twitter. . . .” (Doc. 151 at 3). Finally, the Amended
5The state later amended the date on Count III from a single date
to a time spanning August 24, 2013 through October 2, 2014. (Doc.

Information alleged that Windsor had “emailed Claudia Denker-Eccles,
Associate Counsel for the University of Montana.” (Doc. 151 at 3).
Acting pro se6, Windsor filed a flurry of motions including motions
challenging the validity of the TOP and motions to dismiss the charges
against him. On October 29, 2015 the district court issued an order
dismissing Counts I and II (writing Boushie’s name on a website), and
Count IV (writing Boushie’s name on Twitter).

Windsor’s trial on the remaining two counts commenced on
January 5, 2016. As with the majority of the pre-trial proceedings,
Windsor represented himself during trial. (Doc. 185). The State was
represented by deputy county attorney Jennifer Clark. With Mrs.
Clark was Det. Chris Shermer, a member of the Missoula Police
Department. (Jan. 5, 2016, Tr. at 95)7 Det. Shermer was the lead
6Windsor was originally appointed a public defender, Christopher
Daly. Mr. Daly’s role eventually transitioned into that of stand-by
counsel. Finally, with Windsor’s and the district court’s permission,
Mr. Daly withdrew and Windsor proceeded pro se.
7The transcripts in this matter appear to be grouped and
paginated as a collection of hearings. For example, hearings from April
8, 2015, September 11, 2015, January 5, 2016, and January 6, 2016, are
grouped and paginated as one transcript. Hence, the pagination does
not match the page number for a specific date.

investigator in the case against Windsor. Det. Shermer was listed as a
witness for the State. (Doc. 114 at 2). Windsor also listed Det.
Shermer as a defense witness. (Doc. 169.2 at pg. 1). Unbeknownst to
Windsor, Det. Shermer had been disciplined in October 2010 by the
Missoula Police Department, for “failing to educate himself of the
relevant criminal statutes and by using illegal means of pursuing a
criminal offender.” (Appendix E). Det. Shermer did not testify at
Windsor’s trial but his presence was known to the jury, (Jan. 5, 2016,
Tr. at 95, 130), and he was represented as the lead agent in the case
against Windsor. Det. Shermer also interviewed Boushie in the course
of his investigation. (Jan. 5, 2016, Tr. at 216). Det. Shermer was also
subpoenaed by both the State, (Doc. 169), and his name appears on
Windsor’s witness list (169.2).

Windsor testified on his own behalf at trial. However, because he
was acting pro se and without the benefit of stand-by counsel, he
questioned himself on the witness stand in a question-and-answer
format. While this process seemed to work on direct, it allowed the
prosecution to run roughshod over Windsor’s rights on cross-
examination because his ability to make contemporaneous objections
was compromised. For example, on cross-examination the following
prejudicial colloquy occurred between State’s counsel and Windsor:
State: One of your contentions is that this court is corrupt,

Windsor: Yes.

State: But, in fact, this court actually dismissed three of the
charged counts.

Windsor: Yes. Three felonies.

(Jan. 6, 2016, Vol. I. at 22). A short time later, the prosecutor violated
Mont. R. Evid. 410 by questioning and eliciting testimony from Windsor
on his pre-trial attempts to settle the case. Although Windsor did not
object, the district court did not intervene to prevent an obvious error of
law on the part of the prosecutor. Further, when Windsor attempted to
address these settlement discussions in his closing argument, he was
prohibited from doing so upon objection by the State, despite the fact
that the State had elicited the testimony on cross-examination. (Jan. 6,
2016, Vol. I. at 67).

One of the pillars of Windsor’s defense was that he and Boushie
were also engaged in civil litigation and, as a result, Windsor was
required to serve certain legal documents on Boushie. Boushie’s TOP,
however, prevented Windsor from serving Boushie as required by the
Rules of Civil Procedure. One of Windsor’s arguments was that he had
mailed documents intended for Boushie to an attorney for the
University of Montana, Boushie’s employer. In his opening statement,
Windsor argued:

Some mail was sent to attorney Caudia Denker-Eccles.
At the time my thought was that the ex parte TOP had been
expired for months. I also thought that the ex parte TOP
would not and could not apply to something as vital as the
service of legal documents.

When you’re involved in a civil lawsuit with somebody,
you are required to send them a copy of everything that gets
filed with the court. If you change your address, you have to
– have to serve something. It has to be sent to them
otherwise your case can be dismissed because you didn’t do
it. It’s a – it’s a law. It’s a rule.

So how can somebody be stopped from their civil
litigation with a temporary order of protection issued on an
ex parte basis where I had no notice of it and didn’t even
have an opportunity to speak? I don’t believe you can.
I was confident that I was not violating the ex parte
TOP. I would have never sent anything if I thought it was a
violation.  (Jan. 5, 2016, Tr. 152-53).

Windsor’s proposed jury instructions also resounded with this
very theory of defense: he thought the TOP had expired and even if it
had not, he did not violate it by sending the paperwork to an attorney
working for Boushie’s employer. For example, Windsor’s proposed
instruction 13 reads, in part, “[w]hat a defendant was thinking and
what the defendant intended when the crime was committed matters.

The jury must differentiate between someone who did not mean to
commit a crime and someone who intentionally set out to commit a
crime.” (Appendix D at 28)8. Windsor also objected to what ultimately
became Instruction 15 allowing the jury to infer Windsor’s state of
mind from his actions and other facts. Windsor’s objection was “Better
definitions are provided for both knowingly and purposely.” (Appendix
D at 36). As better definitions, Windsor proposed result-based
definitions of both “knowingly” and “purposely.” (Appendix D at 37-56).
He even provided the district court with applicable legal authority
8Windsor’s proposed jury instructions incorporate lengthy legal
argument. For the Court’s convenience, Appendix D has been
paginated by counsel.

including citations to this Court’s decision in State v. Lambert, 280
Mont. 231, 929 P.2d 846 (1996). The district court denied Windsor’s
instructions and, instead, gave the conduct-based definitions of both
“purposely” and “knowingly.” (Doc 189).

In the end, the jury found Windsor guilty of both counts. (Jan. 6,
2016, Vol. I at 81). The district court sentenced Windsor to two sixmonth
sentences in the Missoula County jail; each sentence to run
consecutively to each other. The district court also imposed $2,000.00
in restitution to Boushie, a $1,000 fine, various fees, and prohibited
Windsor from having any contact with Boushie and his wife. As part of
this restriction, the district court ordered Windsor to take down “any
web site that you have that has Sean Boushie’s name on it. . . .” (Jan.
6, 2016, Vol. I at 96). This prohibition included Windsor from referring
to Boushie on any website. (Jan. 6, 2016, Vol. I at 99).

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the district court
then requested Windsor autograph a copy of Windsor’s “Wanted”
poster. Windsor replied that he “would be delighted.” (Jan. 6, 2016,
Vol. I at 100).


The offense of violating an order of protection requires a singular
result. In this case, the required definitions of “purposely” and
“knowingly” required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Windsor acted with either a conscious object to cause a violation of an
order of protection, or with an awareness that there was a high
probability that his conduct would cause a violation of an order of

Although Det. Shermer did not testify at trial, his presence and
the fruits of his investigation were material to the State’s case. The
evidence that he had been disciplined by his employer and had engaged
in potentially criminal activity was equally material to Windsor’s
defense. Given how Windsor conducted his trial, it is all-but certain
that, had the State disclosed this Brady/Giglio material, Windsor would
have called Det. Shermer to testify for the purpose of discrediting the
investigation and the State’s case.9 The material set forth in Appendix
G would have had a devastating effect on the State’s case, undermined
9Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1971).

the integrity of the investigation into Windsor, and reasonably would
have resulted in a different outcome at trial, especially in light of
Windsor’s repeated references to the corruption represented by his

The district court also erred in allowing the prosecutor to elicit
testimony from Windsor that he had been charged with felonies and
that he had entered into settlement discussions with the State.
Although Windsor was a pro se defendant and required to know the
rules of law and evidence, the district court has a corresponding
obligation to ensure the laws are followed and prosecutor does not take
advantage of the defendant’s ignorance.


This Court reviews jury instructions for abuse of discretion. State
v. Lacey, 2012 MT 52, ¶ 15, 364 Mont. 291, 272 P.3d 1288. “In
considering whether a district court has correctly instructed the jury in
a criminal case, we determine whether the instructions taken as a
whole fully and fairly instructed the jury on law applicable to the case.”
State v. Tellegen, 2013 MT 337, ¶ 5, 372 Mont. 454, 314 P.3d 902 (citing

State v. Hocter, 2011 MT 251, ¶ 14, 362 Mont. 215, 262 P.3d 1089).
Where, as in Windsor’s case, a defendant asserts the district court
misinterpreted the meaning and application of the mental state of the
offense, this Court reviews the district court’s interpretation or
application of the law to determine if such interpretation or application
was correct. State v. Lambert, 280 Mont. 231, 234, 929 P.2d 836, 848

“Alleged Brady violations are reviewed de novo.” United States v.
Brady, 67 F.3d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995). Typically, a district court’s
ruling on a motion for a mistrial is reviewed to determine whether the
district court abused its discretion. State v. Partin, 287 Mont. 12, 18,
951 P.2d 1002 (1996).

“In general, this Court does not address issues of prosecutorial
misconduct pertaining to a prosecutor’s statements not objected to at
trial. However, we may exercise our discretion and review such issues
under the plain error doctrine.” State v. Lawrence, 2016 MT 346, ¶ 6,
386 Mont. 86, 385 P.3d 968. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
“Once the doctrine is invoked, this Court’s review is grounded on our
‘inherent duty to interpret the constitution and to protect individual
rights set forth in the constitution.’” Id (quoting and citing State v.
Finley, 278 Mont. 126, 134, 915 P.2d 208, 213)).


I. Conduct versus Result Mental State Instructions
“It is a basic rule that the trial court’s instructions must cover
every issue or theory having support in the evidence.” State v. Thorton,
218 Mont. 317, 320, 708 P.2d 273, 276 (1985). Additionally, it is a trial
court’s independent duty to ensure the jury instructions in a criminal
case fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.
C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 485, p. 375 (3d ed.2000)
(“It is the duty of the trial judge to charge the jury on all essential
questions of law, whether requested or not”). “[T]he essence of a fair
trial is ensuring that the jury is provided the correct legal principles so
that it may reach the proper conclusion based on the law and the
evidence.” People v. Novak, 643 N.E.2d 762, 774 (Ill. 1994). “Jury
instructions serve an important role in trial. They guarantee decisions
consistent with the evidence and the law. . . .” State v. Andress, 2013
MT 12A, ¶ 14, 368 Mont. 248, 299 P.3d 316.

Here, although Windsor’s proposed instructions are neither a
model of brevity nor fashioned in a manner normally seen by trial
courts, they do adequately set forth the correct result-based definitions
for “knowingly” and “purposely.” This Court has instructed that
“[d]istrict courts should ‘grant wider latitude to pro se litigants’ as long
as that latitude does not prejudice the other party.” State v. Daniels,
2017 MT 163, ¶ 17, ___ Mont. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (quoting and citing
State v. Ferre, 2014 MT 96, ¶ 16, 374 Mont. 428, 322 P.3d 1047). Thus,
Windsor should not be expected to craft his instructions “with the
discrimination of an Oxford don,” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,
459 (1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted), providing that
both the State and the district court can determine the substance of the
proposed instruction.

In Windsor’s case, it was clear from well before trial that a main
portion of his defense was that he was faced with Hobson’s choice:
being required to serve Boushie with legal paperwork in other civil
litigation and a TOP with a scope that completely prohibited Windsor’s
ability to perform that service. Distilled, Windsor’s defense is that he
did not intend to violate the TOP because he had taken steps not to
serve Boushie directly, but legal counsel for Boushie’s employer. In
other words, Windsor took careful, reasoned steps to ensure that his
conduct did not cause the result of violating the TOP. Again, his
proposed instructions reflect both that reality and that theory of

Windsor voir dired jurors on the subject. He asked the venire “If I
tell you, as I will tell you, that I never intended to commit a crime,
would that cause you to doubt that I’m telling the truth? And we’ll
start with you [indicating to a member of the venire].” (Tr. at 120).
The potential juror answer, “Well, intent is a - - is a - - I don’t know
what you intend. I just know the resulting action. I wouldn’t know
what the intention is without some sort of story, and then I wouldn’t be
sure.” (Id). Windsor even tried to introduce exhibits which showed his
attempts to avoid sending anything to Boushie. “What [defendant’s
proposed exhibit 14) has to do with, all of those have to do with showing
mental state and the attempts to avoid sending anything directly to the
petition in this case who was - - Sean was a protected person.” (Tr. at
72). In his opening statement, Windsor argued, “There is a
requirement that you have to knowingly and purposefully do
something, and based on my reading of the case law relative to that it
means you have to have a guilty mind. You have to have an intent.
You have to have an intent that you are going to commit a crime.” (Tr
at 161). While not necessarily the correct legal language, Windsor is
advocating for a result-based theory of defense and relying on the
correct mental state instructions.

This Court is aware of the varying legal definitions of both
“purposely” and “knowingly” that appear in the pattern Montana
Criminal Jury Instructions and the accompanying caution that appears
in the comment section. Both the caution and this Court’s
jurisprudence make it very clear that it is error to give a jury all
possible definitions of “knowingly” and “purposely.” It is also error to
give the incorrect definitions. State v. Rothacher, 272 Mont. 303, 901
P.2d 82 (1995); State v. Lambert, 280 Mont. 231, 929 P.2d 846 (1996);
State v. Patton, 280 Mont. 278, 930 P.2d 635 (1996); State v. Johnston,
2010 MT 152, ¶ 9, 357 Mont. 46, 237 P.3d 70 (citing and quoting State
v. Azure, 2005 MT 328, ¶ 20, 329 Mont. 536, 125 P.3d 116).
Although the district court had previously described the TOP at
issue in this case as containing “vague and unintelligible prohibiton[s]”
(Doc. 150 at 8-9), the court instructed the jury that Windsor would have
the requisite mental state to violate the TOP if it was Windsor’s
“conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature.” (Doc. 189, Inst.

17). The court also instructed the jury that it could find Windsor acted
“knowingly” if the jury found Windsor was “aware of his conduct.”
(Doc. 189, Inst. 18). Both instructions undercut the state’s burden of
proof and are inconsistent with the requirements of the relevant
criminal statute. They were also inconsistent with Windsor’s theory of

Violating an order of protection is a result-based offense and
requires the result-based mental state. “A person commits the offense
of violation of an order of protection if the person, with knowledge of
the order, purposely or knowingly violates a provision of . . . an order of
(emphasis added). Time and time again, this Court has issued opinions
holding that when a criminal offense requires that a defendant act
“purposely” or “knowingly,” the district court is required to instruct the
jury on the definition of purposely and the definition of knowingly that
applies in the context of the particular crime.” Patton, 280 Mont. at
291, 930 P.2d at 643.

Where an offense criminalizes particularized conduct, the
court must instruct the jury with the “conduct-based”
definition, i.e., a person acts purposely when it is his conscious object to
engage in that conduct, and he acts knowingly when he is aware of his
conduct. See Lambert, 280 Mont. at 236, 929 P.2d at 849. Where,
however, an offense does not describe particularized conduct but
instead the result of conduct, then the court must instruct the jury with
the “result-based” definition, i.e., a person acts purposely when it is his
conscious object to cause that result, and he acts knowingly when he is
aware that it is highly probable that the specified result will be caused
by his conduct. Id.

The statute prohibiting violation of an order of protection does not
set forth particular conduct which, if engaged in, results in the
commission of the offense; rather, one “may engage in a wide variety of
conduct and still commit the offense.” Id. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-626
seeks to avoid the singular result of the violation of a protective order,
not the many forms of conduct that result in the violation. In light of
this statutory scheme, the district court erred in giving the “conductbased”
instructions. The effect of these instructions “was to alter the
State’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of
the offense.” Lambert, 280 Mont. at 237, 929 P.2d at 850. As this
Court has noted, “to prove that a defendant was aware of his conduct is
one thing; to prove that he was aware of the high probability of the
risks posed by his conduct is quite another.” Id.

As instructed in Windsor’s case, the state did not have to prove,
and the jury did not have to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Windsor intended to cause the result of violating the TOP, or that he
was aware of a high probability that his conduct would cause that
result. All the state had to prove and the jury had to find was that
Windsor was aware of his conduct, e.g., contacting an attorney for the
University of Montana. This is a much lower burden than proving he
intended to violate the TOP with that conduct.

In his own legally untrained way, Windsor presented the above
argument to the district court. Windsor primarily relied on State v.
Starr, 204 Mont. 210, 664 P.2d 893 (1983) to advocate for the result based
definitions of “purposely” and “knowingly.” While Starr is not as
on-point as cases like Johnston, Lambert, or Patton, it does address the
two necessary functions of a district court in selecting the appropriate
mens rea jury instructions. “Thus, two functions are performed in
analyzing the statute which describes an offense. First, determining
which mental state must be proved, and second, determining to which
of the four conditions or occurrences the mental states relate.” Starr,
204 Mont. at 221, 664 P.2d at 898. The four conditions referenced in
Starr are co-opted from a law review article upon which the Starr court

The Montana code uses only three classifications in
evaluating the defendant’s mental state: purposely,
knowingly, and negligently. These mental state
classifications are defined in relation to four objectively
measurable conditions or occurrences: conduct,
circumstances, facts, and result. However, all four criteria
do not apply to each mental state. ‘Purposely,’ which means
with a conscious objective, relates to conduct or result.

‘Knowingly,’ defined as ‘awareness,’ relates to conduct,
circumstances, facts or result.
Starr, 204 Mont. at 219, 664 P.2d at 898 (citing and quoting, J.
Essman, A Primer on Mental State in the Montana Criminal Code of
1973, 37 Mont. L. Rev. 401, 403-04 (1976)).

With Starr as authority, Windsor offered an instruction that
“purposely refers to the defendant’s objective or intended result.”
(Appendix D at 37). As for his proposed “knowingly” instruction,
Windsor proposed the following language: “A person acted knowingly if
he knew what he did was a crime, or there was a high probability that
his conduct would cause a crime.” (Appendix D at 48). He also argued
for instructing language reading “[t]o find the Defendant guilty in this
case, the State has to prove the Defendant was aware that his conduct
would violate an order of protection or that there was a high probability
that his conduct would violate an order of protection.” (Id). Windsor
was clearly advocating for the legally correct result-based definitions.
In fact, Windsor cited to the district court this Court’s opinions in
Johnston and State v. Azure, 2005 MT 328, ¶ 20, 329 Mont. 536, 125
P.3d 1116.

There is a great deal of chaff in Windsor’s proposed jury
instructions. Contained within, however, are the kernels of the mental
state instructions which fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case. The district court erred in not gleaning these
kernels and then giving the jury the correct mental state definitions of
“purposely” and “knowingly.” The district court had an obligation to
work a little harder to glean these kernels in Windsor’s instructions for
two reasons. First, because Windsor was pro se, the district court
should have extended Windsor wider latitude as long as it did not
prejudice the state. Second, Windsor actually presented the court with
the correct mental state instructions.

The district court abused its discretion in denying Windsor’s
instruction. When jury instructions were settled, the district court
started with the state’s jury instructions. While the state’s proposed
instructions are not found in the court record, the substance can be
ascertained from the discussion. When the court came to state’s
proposed mental state instructions 17 and 18, Windsor objected and
directed the court to his instructions in which he “provided a detailed
proposed instruction, along with extensive backup information, about
mens rea, actus rea. Purposely. When it’s the ‘person’s conscious object
to engage in conduct of that nature.’ If I’m a juror, it means nothing to
me.” (Tr. 298). The district court overruled Windsor’s objections
stating, “Well it’s the statutory definition, the language that’s in the
standard instructions, so it’s language that I’m aware the Montana
Supreme Court has approved.” (Id). Similarly, the court overruled
Windsor’s same objection to the State’s proposed definition of
“knowingly.” The court did, however, tell Windsor that it would look at
Windsor’s instruction after it had a chance to review them in greater
detail. (Tr. 302-03, 304).

After the Court had an opportunity to review Windsor’s proposed
instructions as well as the State’s objections to Windsor’s instructions,
the district court overruled all of Windsor’s objections by simply
“rely[ing] on the state’s notice of objections to defendant’s proposed jury
instructions, court document 172.” (Tr. 308). The state’s “Notice of
Objections to Defendant’s Proposed Jury Instructions” consisted of a
“spreadsheet of objections to Defendant’s proposed instructions.” (Doc.
172). Regarding Windsor’s proposed “purposely” instruction, the
State’s objection reads as follows: “D’s contains inaccurate statement of
law.” The spreadsheet contains the same objection to Windsor’s
“knowingly” instruction.

That is the sum total of the State’s objection.

The sum total of the district court’s exercise of discretion is reference to
the State’s objection in overruling Windsor’s instructions. “That a trial
court has a right to exercise its discretion does not mean a trial court
should not disclose the reasons underlying a discretionary act. Absent
these reasons, we as an appellate court, are left to guess as to why the
trial court made a particular decision.” State v. Stumpf, 187 Mont. 255,
226, 609 P.2d 298, 299 (1980). “[A] court’s failure to exercise its
discretion is, in itself, an abuse of discretion.” State v. Weaver, 276
Mont. 505, 509, 917 P.2d 437, 440 (1996).

Neither the State nor the district court elaborated on what
aspects of Windsor’s proposed “purposely” and “knowingly” instructions
each believed to be misstatements of law. Again, it is certainly true the
instructions contain extraneous material that may be legally incorrect.
However, the fact remains that Windsor’s proposed instructions at
their core presented the district court with the correct mental state
definitions. Nothing in the district courts rulings on either the State’s
proposed instructions or Windsor’s proposed instructions on the topic
evidence any consideration of whether Windsor’s crimes are conductbased
or result-based. Absent evidence of the exercise of this
discretion, or discussion as to why Windsor’s proposed instructions are
denied, this is an abuse of discretion by the district court.
Given the above, Windsor respectfully requests that this Court
conclude the district court erred in instructing the jury, vacate his
conviction, and remand the case to the appropriate court for a new

II. Due Process, Corruption, and Brady v. Maryland
The state violated Windsor’s due process rights in withholding
information pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Specifically, the state and its agency, the Missoula County Police
Department, withheld critical impeachment information on the lead
investigator in Windsor’s case, Det. Shermer. Although Det. Shermer
did not testify, he was listed on both parties’ witness lists, and his role
in Windsor’s case loomed large.

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d
215 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held “that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to
guilt or punishment. . . .” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Montana has adopted
the rationale of Brady. State v. Arlington, 265 Mont. 127, 151-152, 875
P.2d 307, 321-322 (1994). The United States Supreme Court has
broadened Brady to the point where a defendant’s failure to specifically
request does not alleviate the government or the State from its
obligation to disclose favorable evidence. United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976).

In Montana, a party seeking to establish a Brady violation must establish:

(1) the State possessed evidence, including impeachment
evidence, favorable to the defense; (2) the petitioner did not
possess the evidence not could he have obtained it with
reasonable diligence; (3) the prosecution suppressed the
favorable evidence; and (4) had the evidence been disclosed,
a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different.

State v. Giddings, 2009 MT 61, ¶ 48, 349 Mont. 347, 208 P.3d 363
(internal citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has
consistently held that the government “violates a defendant’s right to
due process if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and
material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.” Smith v. Cain, 565
U.S. 73, 75 (2012). “Evidence is ‘material’ within the meaning of Brady
when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Cone
v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-470 (2009). “A reasonable probability does
not mean the defendant ‘would more likely than not have received a
different verdict with the evidence,’ only that the likelihood of a
different result is great enough to ‘undermine confidence in the
outcome of the trial.’” Smith, 565 U.S. at 75 (citing and quoting Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). “The question is not whether the
defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. “A defendant need not demonstrate that after
discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed
evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict.” Kyles, 514
U.S. at 434-35.

After trial and sentencing, Windsor discovered that Det. Shermer
had been disciplined by the Missoula Police Department in October
2010 for “violating MPD policies.” (Appendix F). While this alone may
not constitute a Brady violation, it was the nature of Det. Shermer’s
violations that demonstrate a Brady violation occurred in Windsor’s
case. As noted in Appendix F, Det. Shermer had been in search of a
another defendant with an outstanding warrant. Det. Shermer had
reason to believe that defendant was in Billings. “Shermer contacted a
job service agency posing to be the wanted defendant and used the
personal identifiers known to him through [Shermer’s] access to the
[defendant’s] case file. After providing verifying information from the
file, Detective Shermer obtained the user name and password for the
defendant’s job service account and his last know address.”

In her letter to the Missoula Police Department, the Missoula
County Attorney’s Office acknowledges that, as a result of his actions,
Det. Shermer “must be placed on a Giglio/Brady list, which will
negatively impact his ability to perform his duties as a witness in our
cases.” (Appendix F).   (CLICK HERE TO READ LETTER)

Although the county attorney’s letter indicates that it did not
learn of Det. Shermer’s discipline until late June 2016, after Windsor’s
trial and sentencing, the county attorney does address her obligations
under Kyles which, in the words of the county attorney, “imposed upon
the prosecutor an affirmative ‘duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government’s behalf, including the
police,’ and a resulting duty to disclose that evidence to the defense.”
(Appendix F) (citing and quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 419). The county
attorney acknowledges that her “office will now have to go back and
notify every defendant who has been convicted in a case investigated by
Detective Shermer since October, 2010 of these findings. This will
inevitably lead to post-conviction litigation in many cases.” (Appendix
F) (emphasis added).

Det. Shermer was the lead investigator in Windsor’s case, and the
material included in Appendix F should have been discovered and
disclosed by the state. During trial, the state informed the court that
“Detective Shermer verified that the web site []
was still active after the order of protection had been issued.” (Tr. 54).
That the site was still active, this formed the basis of one of the
charges against Windsor. Det. Shermer was present during trial and
was introduced to the jury at the beginning of trial. (Tr. 92). Members
of the venire knew Det. Shermer. (Tr. 95). In his cross-examination of
Boushie, Windsor asked Boushie if he had lied to Det. Shermer. (Tr.
216). Finally, Det. Shermer was the only named law enforcement
officer appearing numerous times on the State’s Affidavit and Motion
for Leave to file Information because Det. Shermer took the original
complaint from Boushie. (Doc. 1)

For better or for worse, Windsor maintained in his closing
argument that Montana was “the most corrupt state in the country.”
(Jan. 6, 2016, Vol. I at 33). Prior to trial, he had also made a film
proclaiming this sentiment. As part of his zealous attempt to represent
himself pro se, Windsor had even filed a request to depose Det.
Shermer and subpoena documents from him. (Doc. 70). The district
court denied this request because the state “agreed it would make these
witnesses avail. for interview by Defendant.” (Doc. 70 at 1). It is
unknown whether Windsor ever interviewed Det. Shermer, but given
Windsor’s zeal and attempts to weed out corruption, had he know of the
information contained in Appendix F, he most certainly would have
used it. Windsor did allege that he met with the State’s attorney and
Det. Shermer regarding this case on August 17, 2015. (Doc. 92 at 2).
Windsor also argued that “Chris Shermer never contacted the
Defendant or anyone other than Sean Boushie and the University of
Montana about these charges. None of these people has any knowledge
about what the defendant did ‘knowingly and purposely’ or otherwise,
so they must not be allowed to testify that they do.” (Doc. 96 at 10).
Finally, in pretrial motions, Windsor argued, “William M. Windsor
must be allowed to introduce character evidence regarding Sean
Boushie and Chris Shermer. Both are liars, and evidence must be
presented.” (Doc. 97 at 5). This statement was made in a Response to
the State’s First Motions in Limine.

Windsor’s pretrial pleadings repeatedly accuse Det. Shermer of
threatening Windsor with a federal offense, lying, and mocking him.
The evidence in Appendix F was certainly material to Windsor’s theory
of defense and his case in chief. (Doc. 98 and Ex. A, thereto). That Det.
Shermer did not end up testifying at trial does not make the
Brady/Giglio information contained in Appendix F any less material.
In fact, according to this Court’s decision in State v. Weisbarth, 2016
Mont. 214, 384 Mont. 424, 378 P.3d 1195, the fact that Det. Shermer
did not testify may make the information more material.

In Weisbarth, this court addressed a Brady violation in the form
of medical records for an alleged child victim. After a specific request
for the records, the defense was presented with a heavily redacted
version of the documents. Weisbarth, ¶¶ 1-6. The redacted material
“contained evidence that was clearly favorable to the defense. . . .”
Weisbarth, ¶ 1. One of the reasons that the material was favorable was
because it was plain from the record that it was “relevant to the
defense’s trial strategy.” Weisbarth, ¶ 3. On appeal, the State raised a
number of arguments against Weisbarth’s Brady argument, all of
which were dismissed by this Court.

One of the state’s arguments was that “for the purposes of Brady,
inadmissible evidence cannot be considered favorable evidence because
it cannot be used by the defense at trial.” Weisbarth, ¶ 23. This Court
agreed “with the majority of courts that have addressed the issue. The
focus of the inquiry should not be on whether the evidence is admissible
or inadmissible, but whether the evidence is favorable to the defense
and could have affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Weisbarth, ¶
24. This Court properly noted the need for the material at both a trial
and pre-trial stage. The latter is especially critical because it affects
both defense strategy and investigation.

We decline to develop a rule that would foreclose the
development of defense strategy and investigation or to
presuppose what information the defense may have
developed as a result of properly disclosed evidence. In light
of the policy underlying Brady, we believe that even
inadmissible evidence could have ‘substantial value to the
defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed.’
Weisbarth, ¶ 24 (citing and quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110). The
material contained in Appendix F would have been critical to both
Windsor’s defense strategy and investigation and thus should have
been disclosed to him.

A second argument rebuffed by this Court in Weisbarth was that
Weisbarth could have obtained the exculpatory evidence through the
exercise of reasonable diligence. Weisbarth, ¶ 29. While this Court
acknowledged that its Brady requirement “is now seemingly at odds
with that of the Ninth Circuit,” it declined to address the conflict and
concluded that Weisbarth had exercised diligence in his quest for the
medical records. Weisbarth, ¶ 30 (citing and quoting Amando v.
Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014)). “Here, Weisbarth had
no way of knowing what evidence the medical records contained and he
did the only thing he could do to obtain the records by filing a motion
with the District Court requesting their disclosure.” Weisbarth, ¶ 30.
Although he did not have defense counsel for the lion’s share of
his case, Windsor exercised a similar diligence to Weisbarth. Windsor
filed numerous motions for the production of documents, requests for
depositions, interviews, and records. On May 1, 2015, while still in
custody, Windsor filed a “Motion Regarding Discovery.” (Doc. 38). In
this motion Windsor sought “approval of the Court to take depositions
by video and telephone” of the witnesses against him. One of these
witnesses was Det. Shermer. (Doc. 3 at 3). Windsor made a specific
request for the court to issue subpoenas for depositions with document
production to all of the witnesses named in the State’s Information.
(Doc. 70). Among those witnesses was Det. Shermer. In his request,
Windsor attached an exhibit detailing the documents he wanted
produced by Det. Shermer. The documents requested included “All
documents relating or referring to, or evidencing, reflecting or
constituting your job application with the Missoula Police Department.”
(Doc. 70, Request for Deposition of Chris Shermer, Ex. at 4)10.
Notwithstanding the county attorney’s own concession that her office
had an affirmative obligation to obtain Det. Shermer’s disciplinary
record and disclose it, Windsor’s request for deposition and document
production is a reasonable exercise of diligence for one unschooled in
the law and discovery requests. In short: Windsor exercised reasonable
diligence in attempting to obtain the exculpatory and impeachment
material contained in Appendix F.

Windsor’s case establishes not one but all of the necessary
10This document can be found at page 898 of the 2,488 page
combined district court record.
requirements for a Brady violation. As a result, a new trial is the
appropriate remedy. “[O]nce a court finds a Brady violation, a new
trial follows as the prescribed remedy, not as a matter of discretion.”
United States v. Oruche, 484 F.3d 590, 595-96 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
III. District Court Error and the Right to a Fair Trial

Twice during her cross-examination of Windsor, the prosecutor
asked Windsor impermissible questions which violated his right to a
fair trial as they were clearly impermissible and prejudicial. However,
at the time of the questions, Windsor was his own counsel and a
witness; therefore, he was both unable to register an objection to the
questions and unaware that he had to register an objection.
The state’s cross-examination of Windsor featured the following
two exchanges.

State: One of your contentions is that this court is corrupt, correct?

Windsor: Yes.

State: But, in fact, this court actually dismissed three of the charged counts.

Windsor: Yes. Three felonies.

(Jan. 6, 2016, Vol. I. at 22).
. . . .
State: Well, you and I discussed resolution of this case, correct?

Windsor: You offered to settle several times.

State: You did not want to do that, correct?

Windsor: I said that if you wanted to dismiss the charges, I would agree.

State: And I offered to dismiss those charges, correct?

Windsor: With strings attached, yes.

State: Because all I told you I wanted out of this case was for you to leave Mr. Boushie alone.

(Jan. 6, 2016, Vol. I. at 26-27).

Both exchanges violated Windsor’s right to a fair trial and Rule
410 of the Montana Rules of Evidence. Rule 410 reads in relevant part:
Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of
nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo
contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of
statements made in connection with any of the foregoing
pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal
action, case or proceedings against the person who made the
plea or offer.

It is prosecutorial misconduct to tell a jury of offers to plead guilty or
settlement offers. See State v. Sha, 292 Minn. 182, 193 N.W.2d 829
(Minn. 1963) (ordering a new trial when prosecutor elicited testimony
that defendant said he wanted to plead guilty). Here, although
Windsor had not offered to plead guilty, the prosecutor’s questioning
still violated Rule 410 because they revealed “statements made in
connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers.” Mont. R. Evid.

The prosecutor similarly erred in eliciting testimony from
Windsor that he had been charged with three felonies that the district
court had dismissed. Such testimony invites unwarranted speculation
in the minds of jurors and impermissibly invites speculation on the
defendant’s potential punishment. State v. Zuidema, 157 Mont. 367,
373-74, 485 P.2d 952, 955 (1971). “[P]roviding jurors sentencing
information invites them to ponder matters that are not within their
province, distracts them from their fact finding responsibilities, and
creates a strong possibility of confusion.” State v. E.M.R., 2013 MT 3, ¶
24, 368 Mont. 179, 292 P.3d 451 (citing Shannon v. United States, 512
U.S. 573, 579, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2424, 129 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1994)).

This Court has held that “one accused of a crime is entitled to
have guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence
introduced at trial, not on the grounds of official suspicion, indictment,
continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.
. . .” State v. Williams, 184 Mont. 111, 113, 601 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1979)
(quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-85, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 1934-
35, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1978)). Here, the State elicited testimony from
Windsor that the Court had dismissed three felonies. The question was
objectionable, and the answer permitted the jury to speculate on why
the charges where dismissed, the severity of the charges remaining,
and what the previous felonies might have been.

It is also not beyond reason that a juror may have speculated that
Windsor had his previous felony charges dropped on some type of legal
technicality, thus triggering that juror’s desire to balance the scales or
convict Windsor of something. This logic is simply an extension of why
jurors are often precluded from learning of a defendant’s prior
convictions or previous allegations. “Unfair prejudice can arise from
evidence that arouses the jury’s hostility or sympathy for one side
without regard to its probative value.” State v. Bieber, 2007 MT 262, ¶
59, 339 Mont. 309, 170 P.3d 444. Similarly, it is also why courts
disallow evidence that a defendant has been previously acquitted of a
serious crime. See e.g., Blackburn v. Cross, 510 F.2d 1014, 1019 (5th
Cir. 1975) (although evidence of guilt was “quite convincing,” admission
of testimony that the appellant committed a prior crime for which
appellate was acquitted was not harmless error).

The reality is that, other than the jurors, Windsor was the least
legally educated individual at his trial. Had he been represented by
competent counsel, that counsel would have known to object to these
questions and to request a mistrial when the prosecution introduced
evidence that Windsor’s prior felony charges had been dismissed. Even
if the prosecutor wades into these prejudicial waters hoping to take
advantage of Windsor’s legal skill, it was the district court’s obligation
to stop the prosecutor and ensure Windsor received a fair trial. State v.
Griffin, 2016 MT 231, ¶ 9, 385 Mont. 1, 386 P.3d 559 (“A criminal
defendant has a right to a fair trial under both the United States and
Montana Constitutions. The district court’s bears the duty to insure
that the defendant receives a fair trial.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).

Given Windsor’s lack of legal training, the prosecutor’s comments,
and the district court’s failure to intervene, Windsor’s right to a fair
trial was violated, and he respectfully requests this Court reverse his
conviction and remand his case for a new trial.


Given the events at trial including problems with jury
instructions and improper questioning, as well as the subsequently
discovered Brady material, it is clear that Windsor’s conviction stands,
at best, on shaky ground. Given the totality of these errors, this Court
can have no confidence in the validity of the jury’s verdict. Therefore,
Windsor respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand his
case to the appropriate court for a new and fair trial.

Respectfully submitted this 26th day of July, 2017.
/s/ Colin M. Stephens
Colin M. Stephens
Attorney for Windsor "

Dated this 26th day of July, 2017.

/s/ Colin M. Stephens
Colin M. Stephens
Attorney for Appellant

I, Colin M. Stephens, hereby certify that I have served true and accurate copies of the foregoing
Brief - Appellant's Opening to the following on 07-26-2017:

Timothy Charles Fox (Prosecutor)
Montana Attorney General
215 North Sanders
PO Box 201401
Helena MT 59620
Representing: State of Montana

Kirsten H. Pabst (Prosecutor)
200 W. Broadway
Missoula MT 59802
Representing: State of Montana

Chad M. Wright (Attorney)
Representing: William M. Windsor
Service Method: eService
Electronically Signed By: Colin M. Stephens
Dated: 07-26-2017  "

Source and Full Document as Filed

Pabst Letter,

Detective Chris Shermer had been disciplined by the Missoula Police Department [MPD] in October 2010 for violations of MPD policies.

"July 6, 2016
Chief Mike Brady
Missoula City Police Department
RE: Detective Chris Shermer

Dear Chief Brady,

When we met last week, I learned that Detective Shermer had been disciplined by the Missoula
Police Department [MPD] in October 2010 for violations of MPD policies. Specifically, after an
internal investigation conducted by the MPD, Detective Shermer was found in violation of two
Articles of the Canon of Ethics, namely Article 3 and 4, by failing to educate himself of the
relevant criminal statutes and by using illegal means of pursuing a criminal offender. According
to MPD's report, the conduct that led to these :findings was as follows:

Detective Shermer investigated a criminal defendant for internet related child
pornography offenses. The investigation resulted in the issuance of an arrest warrant for
that defendant. That defendant lived in Billings and while Detective Shermer was in
Billings for an unrelated case, he began to search for that defendant to serve the arrest

Detective Shermer posed as that defendant in a telephone call to the Billings Job Service.
After providing verifying information, Detective Shermer obtained the user name and
password for the defendant's job service account and his last known address.

When the address did not verify through the 911 dispatch center, Detective Shermer used
the user name and password to access the defendant's job service account and verify he
wrote it down correctly. Once he confirmed he had written the address correctly he
logged out, realizing the information was of no value. He later arrested the defendant by
other means.

This letter is to notify you that based on the findings in the internal investigation, Detective
Shenner must be placed on a Giglio/Brady list, which will negatively impact his ability to
perform his duties as a witness in our cases. Any conduct or statement that affects an officer's
reputation for honesty and credibility has a direct relation to that officer's ability-or inabilityto
testify at trial.

History of Giglio

In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

In Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court extended the obligation to share exculpatory
information with the defendant to include information concerning the credibility of government
witnesses. "when the reliability of a given witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence,"
the Court wrote, "nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule."
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

In United States v. Agurs, the Supreme Court expanded the rule further by recognizing a due
process duty to disclose exculpatory information even in the absence of a specific request for it.
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). The duty to disclose includes impeachment
evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).

Finally, the Court's decision in Kyles v. Whitley imposed upon the prosecutor an affirmative
"duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf,
including the police," and a resulting duty to disclose that evidence to the defense. Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).

A "Giglio-impaired" agent is one against whom there is potential impeachment evidence that
would render the agent's testimony of marginal value in a case, which means that a case that
depends primarily on the testimony of a Giglio-impaired witness is at risk. Cameron v.
Department of Justice, 100 M.S.P.R. 477,482 n. 1 (2005), review dismissed, 165 F. App'x 856
(Fed. Cir. 2006).

Montana Law

Evidence of a witness's untruthfulness is relevant and admissible under the Montana Rules of
Evidence. Mont. R. Evid. 401, 608(b), 61 l(b)(l). Additionally, the State is required to provide
materials which can be used to impeach a witness pursuant to our discovery statute, Mont. Code
Ann. § 46-15-322 (l)(e), in every case where the officer might testify.

Impeachment information may include but is not strictly limited to: (a) specific instances of
conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking the witness' credibility or character for
truthfulness; (b) evidence in the form of opinion or reputation as to a witness's character for
truthfulness; ( c) prior inconsistent statements; and ( d) information that may be used to suggest
that a witness is biased. It also includes any finding of misconduct that reflects upon the
truthfulness or possible bias of the employee, including a finding oflack of candor during an
administrative inquiry.

Detective Shermer Findings

A review of the internal investigation reveals instances of untruthfulness and deception which
will require disclosure by the prosecution every time he is called as a witness. Additionally, our
office will now have to go back and notify every defendant who has been convicted in a case
investigated by Detective Shermer since October, 2010 of these findings. This will inevitably
lead to post-conviction litigation in many of the cases.

Public Policy

A police officer's job is a position of trust and the public has a right to the highest standard of
behavior from those they invest with the power and authority of a law enforcement officer.
Honesty, credibility and temperament are crucial to the proper performance of an officer's duties.
The importance of police honesty cannot be overstated. Police officers rely on the validity of
information provided to them by fellow officers. Supervisors render decisions based on
information received from officers. Citizens will better communicate and cooperate with law
enforcement officials that they trust.

Prosecutors depend on honest reports, statements, and affidavits when prosecuting criminals. Judges rely on honesty in evaluating warrants. Jurors determine guilt or innocence and often liability based on an officer's investigation and testimony.

As a matter of public policy, dishonesty by law enforcement officers cannot be condoned.

The findings of dishonesty essentially render Detective Shermer ineffective as a witness because
of required Brady disclosures.


Kirsten H. Pabst
Missoula County Attorney

(406) 523-4737
FAX# (406) 523-4915

Notice of potential impeachment material RE: Officer Chris Shermer
To Whom it May Concern,

Detective Shermer was disciplined by the Missoula Police Department [MPD] in October 2010
for violating MPD policies. Specifically, Officer Shermer investigated a criminal defendant for
internet child pornography offenses. The investigation resulted in the issuance of an arrest
warrant for that defendant. Shermer went to Billings to search for the defendant and serve the
arrest warrant. Shermer contacted a job service agency posing to be the wanted defendant and
used the personal identifiers known to him through his access to the case file. After providing
verifying information from the file, Detective Shermer obtained the user name and password for
the defendant's job service account and his last known address. Shermer later arrested the
defendant by other means."

Source and Full Document

Also Check Out


Monday, July 31, 2017

Brian O’Connell and Ashley Crispin: Jury’s $16,400,000 verdict award against Brian O’Connell and Ashley Crispin of Ciklin Lubitz & O’Connell. “through the jury verdict, it appears the people of south Florida demand accountability from the lawyers (and guardians) appointed by the legal system to represent the interests, and protect the assets, of its incapacitated citizens.”

"Florida: Jury awards $16.4 Million against guardianship attorneys

"On Friday, July 28, 2017, a unanimous jury in the U. S. District Court, West Palm Beach Courthouse, awarded $16,400,000 to the Estate of Oliver Wilson Bivins, Sr., and against West Palm Beach guardianship attorneys, Brian O’Connell and Brian O’Connell of the Ciklin Lubitz & O’Connell law firm. 

The hotly contested two-week jury trial was handled by BBLF partners Ron Denman, Chuck Bavol and Grant Kindrick.

The jury found that attorneys Brian O’Connell and Ashley Crispin had breached both their professional and fiduciary duties to Oliver Wilson Bivins, Sr., an incapacitated ward of the State of Florida. 

The complaint against Brian O’Connell and Ashley Crispin and their law firm, Ciklin Lubitz & O’Connell, alleged that they engaged in actions that increased their own attorneys’ fees to the detriment of Mr. Bivins’ guardianship estate.

In the federal lawsuit filed by his son, Julian Bivins, in his capacity as personal representative of the Estate of Oliver Bivins, Sr., lawyers for the Estate argued during the trial that guardianship attorneys Brian O’Connell and Ashley Crispin, litigated to keep Mr. Bivins located in Florida and to prevent him from returning to his decades old home in Amarillo, Texas, in order to maintain control over the Florida guardianship so they could generate legal fees. 

Attorneys for the Estate argued that throughout the four-year guardianship, Brian O’Connell, Ashley Crispin and the Ciklin Lubitz & O’Connell law firm charged Mr. Bivins’ guardianship estate over $1,000,000 in legal fees while liquidating real estate assets at values detrimental to the estate and entered into self-serving agreements with third parties that failed to serve the best interests of the guardianship estate.

During the guardianship, the court record reflects that Mr. O’Connell and Ms. Crispin also filed lawsuits against both of Oliver Wilson Bivins Sr.’s children and funded the litigation through the substantial assets of their incapacitated father.

The jury’s $16,400,000 verdict award against Brian O’Connell and Ashley Crispin, for actions taken in connection with the guardianship, presided over in the guardianship court by Judge Martin Colin, marks yet another entry into the intrigue surrounding professional guardians in the Palm Beach County Guardianship and Probate Courts.

Based on this significant jury verdict and the ongoing investigative journalism in Southern Florida concerning professional guardianships, the need for reform of the guardianship system to protect Florida’s elderly citizens is again underscored.

After the verdict, the Estate’s lead counsel, Ron Denman, commented “through the jury verdict, it appears the people of south Florida demand accountability from the lawyers (and guardians) appointed by the legal system to represent the interests, and protect the assets, of its incapacitated citizens.”

Press Release from the
The Bleakley Bavol Law Firm
Tampa, FL"


Sounds Like Pattern and Practice to Me. Racketeering perhaps? RICO?

Wednesday, July 19, 2017

Fort Lauderdale Estate & Trust Litigation Lawyer Mark R. Manceri WITHDREW as counsel for Bernstein Family Realty (Janet Craig Oppenheimer), Donald Tescher, and Robert Spallina. Did Mark Manceri REPORT any Fraud, Corruption, Forgery, Collusion, or other Crimes he knew about to the Authorities or the Courts? Or did Mark R. Manceri of Fort Lauderdale simply Withdraw and NOT report Known Fraud on the Courts?

Mark R. Manceri of Fort Lauderdale, Florida and the Simon Bernstein Estate Case

January 10th 2014 shows Mark Manceri filing a motion to withdraw as counsel for Bernstein Family Realty (Janet Craig Oppenheimer) Donald Tescher, and Robert Spallina.

It was clear at that time that there was massive fraud and there were real victims of that fraud. So did Mark Manceri report the KNOWN fraud?

Mr Manceri as he likes to be called and not MARK as that is NOT professional, well it sure seems to me that Mark Manceri has not acted professionally and reported KNOWN fraud.

Also Check Out

more on this Story at

Mark Manceri. Florida Bar Number: 964980. 615 Northeast Third Avenue.
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304.

Fort Lauderdale Estate & Trust Litigation Lawyer
Mark R. Manceri  Fort Lauderdale Probate Litigation Lawyer 

Sunday, July 9, 2017

Jackson National Life Insurance, Heritage Union Life Insurance Company, Don Sanders; and the Case of Alleged Murder, No Insurance Policy and yet Nearly 2 Million PAID out; WITH NO POLICY, Arsenic in a Coroners Report and Massive Fraud

Pamela SIMON "Friendly" Carrier. Ya Know where you don't NEED a Policy and No Questions are asked and Heritage / Jackson turns over millions. WOW.

Does Jackson National Life Insurance ALLOW People to claim they have a Policy, produce No Policy or Contract, have an imaginary Trustee to the Non-Policy and turn over BIG BUCKS? Does Jackson National Life Insurance think it is ok, legal, ethical or is it a Jackson National Policy to murder someone then claim they had a life insurance Policy and WOW Jackson National turns over the money with NO POLICY, no investigation and seemingly no questions asked???

So who is it at Jackson National Life Insurance Company that is behind the Simon Bernstein Estate Case, LaSalle National Trust, Robert Spallina, Ted Bernstein Insurance Scandal?

Who is it at Jackson National Life Insurance Company that is protecting Ted Bernstein, Robert Spallina, Donald Tescher and other mystery players?

Why would Jackson National Life Insurance fund a life insurance policy that they cannot prove exists? I guess this means any one of you out there reading this can claim you have a policy at  Jackson National Life Insurance and they will simply put the money into a fund for you, Right?

Does Ted Bernstein, Insurance Guy, have something on Jackson National Life Insurance or one of their muckity mucks? Why would they turn their heads while Ted Bernstein, Robert Spallina and Donald Tescher pull a big ol' whammy on them?

Why did Judge Amy J. St. Eve let Tescher & Spallina out of the Jackson National Life Insurance scandal? Why did Jackson National simply fund the imaginary policy instead of make a stand for what is right, for the law and possibly SUE Tescher & Spallina for millions on top of millions for Fraud on the Court, fraudulent documents and insurance fraud.

I mean there sure seems to be plenty of evidence and surely Jackson National has the money and legal team to sue Tescher & Spallina and win, so why cut a check and run? What is the REAL ulterior motive or conflict of interest behind the scenes?

The only reason that makes sense to me is Jackson National knows they are liable for a whole lot more then the amount they paid and possibly even they themselves or Heritage Union was involved in the fraud itself or even the alleged murder.

Does Jackson National Care if their Policy Holder was murdered for an inheritance?

Surely Jackson National Life Insurance does not want you to get life insurance on your parents, spouse or others you know and then simply murder them to get the pay off.

Why would Jackson National Life Insurance fund the policy when perhaps if it was murder then they would not have to pay right? Unless the mystery MISSING policy specifically says, hey if ya murder your Dad, or the imaginary policy holder, we are still happy to PAY. Accidental Death or Murder, don't matter to US, we simply cut you a check.

What does Jackson National Life Insurance Company CEO and President Michael Andrew Wells, think of all this? What does CFO Andrew Boutwell Hopping think?

What in the world is James P. Binder, Chief Risk Officer Thinking?

How about COO James Ronald Sopha or board members Howard John Davies of Phoenix Group Holdings Plc or Paul Victor Falzon Sant Manduca of Prudential PLC or David L. Porteous of McCurdy Wotila & Porteous?

How did Heritage Union Life Insurance or Jackson National Life Insurance lose the contract, the policy or whatever paperwork was needed to PROVE that a policy actually existed and who the beneficiary was and to what amount.

I think all you reading this should throw your name into the proverbial hat as a successor to the trust, or a policy holder. See Jackson National Insurance Company does not care if you prove it, just say you are the rightful owner, stomp your feet, and they will say oh ok you are right there was a policy and contract though we can't find it, so here ya go. Oh wait, sorry we are giving the money on the imaginary policy to the court cuz we can't find the contract, then the court can give it to you or your sibling or whom ever. We don't care what the policy owner actually wanted or if there was a policy?

Jackson National Life Insurance brags "Go Paperless" that must be why they go Policy-Less

Eliot Bernstein Disclosure; Heritage Union Life Insurance; Jackson National Life Insurance

Why is Heritage Union Life Insurance Company / Jackson National really funding an invisible policy with so much PROVEN fraud and forgery?  Makes me want to call up Heritage Union Life Insurance Company and say hey I had a policy too.

I bet Jackson National Life Insurance Company ends up paying 10 times the amount they cut a check and ran from.

More Research

Sheriff Report, Spallina

Palm Beach County Sheriff Office Supplemental Report

Heritage Claim Form, Spallina Fraud

Fraud on the Courts, Tescher Spallina and Ted Bernstein

Full Docket Illinois

"Jackson National Life Insurance Company (often referred to as simply Jackson) is a U.S. company that offers annuities for retail investors and fixed income products for institutional investors. Jackson subsidiaries and affiliates provide specialized asset management and retail brokerage services. Jackson is a subsidiary of the British insurer, Prudential plc, which acquired the company for $608 million in 1986. Prudential plc is not affiliated in any manner with Prudential Financial, Inc., a company whose principal place of business is in the United States of America.

Founded in 1961, Jackson is headquartered in Lansing, Michigan. The company and its affiliates also have offices in Denver, Colorado; Nashville, Tennessee; Santa Monica, California; Chicago, Illinois; Tampa, Florida; Appleton, Wisconsin; Purchase, New York; and Bismarck, North Dakota.

Jackson markets its products in 49 states and the District of Columbia through independent and regional broker-dealers, wirehouses, financial institutions and independent insurance agents. A subsidiary of Jackson, Jackson National Life Insurance Company of New York, markets products similarly within the state of New York."


Originally Posted At

Heritage Union Life Insurance Company is well aware of what is going on in the Simon Bernstein Case. So is Heritage Union part of the fraud? If not then why have they, themselves not joined in to SUE Tescher & Spallina and to cry out fraud on the courts, insurance fraud and possible murder?

Letter To Mark Sarlitto ~ Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Heritage Union Life Insurance Company / WiltonRe and Chris Stroup ~ Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer.

"From: Eliot Ivan Bernstein [] 
Sent: Wednesday, May 21, 2014 6:19 AM

To: Mark Sarlitto ~ Senior Vice President and General Counsel @ Heritage Union Life / WiltonRe (; Chris Stroup ~ Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer @ Heritage Union Life / WiltonRe (

Policy Number: 1009208 on the life of SIMON L. BERNSTEIN

Dear Mr. Stroup and Mr. Sarlitto @ Heritage Union Life / Wilton RE,

I am writing regarding the Life Insurance Policy on my father, Simon L. Bernstein (deceased), Policy No. 1009208.  It has come to my attention through a Federal Court case titled “Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Insurance Trust Dtd 612111995, et. al. v. Heritage Union Life Insurance Company, et. al,” Case No.13 cv 3643 in the US District Court Northern District of Illinois that a claim was filed with Heritage by a one Robert Spallina, Esq. of the law firm Tescher & Spallina PA, acting as the Trustee for an alleged lost trust named “The Simon Bernstein 1995 Irrevocable Insurance Trust” claimed to be the Contingent Beneficiary, however no executed copies of the Trust exist as of this date.  

Further, Mr. Spallina represented that he has never seen nor been in possession of the lost trust, yet he filed a claim with Heritage Union acting as the Trustee of that lost trust he never saw or possessed.   

Further, from production documents in the Federal Case it was also learned that Spallina additionally represented himself to the carrier as the Trustee of the alleged Primary Beneficiary of the Policy, a one LaSalle National Trust, N.A., of which he also is not.  

The claim was DENIED due to the inability to show a proper beneficiary and produce a legal valid trust document as beneficiary.  

Legally, a valid executed trust instrument must be present at death for a trust to be paid any benefits and in the case of a lost beneficiary at death Florida law is clear that the benefit should be paid to the Estate of the insured.

Mr. Spallina and his partner Donald Tescher, Esq. have recently resigned as Personal Representatives/Executors, Trustees and Counsel to the Estate and Trusts of Simon Bernstein, after admittedly altering Trust documents in my parents Estates and Trusts to illegally change beneficiaries and whose Notary Public and Legal Assistant, a one Kimberly Moran has been arrested and convicted of Fraud and admitted to six counts of FORGERY of estate documents, including a POST MORTEM FORGERY of my deceased father’s name in efforts to alter the beneficiaries of my deceased mother’s estate.  

They also used my deceased father to act as Personal Representative/Executor after he was deceased and consummated a fraud on the Florida Probate Court under Judge Martin Colin

After the claim was rightfully denied by Heritage, certain of Simon’s children who were wholly disinherited in the Estate plan by both Simon and his deceased spouse Shirley, Theodore Stuart Bernstein and Pamela Simon, filed a Breach of Contract lawsuit against Heritage Union and in this action Theodore suddenly now claimed he was the Trustee of the lost trust and not Spallina.  

Theodore Bernstein it has been learned from a Palm Beach County Sheriff investigation report, attached herein, is alleged to have taken already improper distributions of assets in his alleged fiduciary capacities, AGAINST THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL.  

You will note that in Jackson National’s initial opposition to the lawsuit on behalf of Heritage, Jackson also claimed that Theodore had NO LEGAL STANDING to the file the lawsuit in the first place and was advised by counsel of such, which appears a correct legal analysis.

Due to these alleged FRAUDULENT ACTIVITIES that took place in the filing of the life insurance claim, I have contacted the Jacksonville, IL Police department and spoke with Detective Scott Erthal who opened Case No. 2014000865.  

Detective Erthal then contacted me and told me he had spoken to Carol Ann Kindred at Heritage Union and that they would be conducting the initial FRAUD investigation internally.  

I was surprised when I got the attached letter from C.A. Kindred, which attempts to inform me that Heritage is not investigating the alleged FRAUDULENT claim filed with the company, most surprising is why she did not direct her letter to Detective Erthal and instead contacted me to inform me that Heritage was refusing to conduct an investigation.  

C.A. Kindred also stated that the Federal Court would be handling the Fraud issues and obviously Federal Courts do not conduct criminal investigations or insurance investigations. 

As you may know, life insurance carriers are legally required to attempt to find the true and proper beneficiary of an insurance contract upon death and in this instance no effort has been made to either contact LaSalle National Trust, N.A. to join the Federal lawsuit by the life insurance carrier or any other party and attempts are being made to pay an alleged contingent beneficiary (the lost trust, which is not listed with the carrier as the contingent beneficiary according to their records) without first paying the Primary Beneficiary, a truly bizarre case.

The Life Insurance contract has also not been produced and it appears Heritage and their Successors and their reinsurers have all lost the contract that the Breach of Contract lawsuit was filed on, making an almost surreal lawsuit where neither the alleged Plaintiff, the lost trust is legally nonexistent and the contract the breach is based upon also does not exist.  

In efforts to secure the contract I am asking that you check your files for Heritage and see if you can locate one.  It also has come to my attention that no one has notified the Primary Beneficiary or made any efforts to this date to make contact with them, LaSalle National Trust, N.A., which is now owned by:

Chicago Title Land Trust Company
10 South LaSalle Street, Suite 2750
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Tel:  312.223.2195

As hearings in the Federal Case are proceeding quickly, your prompt attention to these matters is required and please inform me of your work with the Jacksonville PD so that I may know if this matter has to be investigated by Federal Authorities at this time for the initial alleged Fraudulent claim made to Heritage Union that Heritage and its successors refuse to investigate internally.  

I have contacted your offices as it appears that the Heritage Union Life Insurance Company website was taken down and refers now to Wilton RE as the successor.  

Attorney for Jackson National Life in the Federal case, Alexander Marks, Esq. has told the Federal Court Judge, Amy St. Eve, that Heritage et al. while being discharged from the Federal lawsuit would be willing to help the parties in any way and this refusal to investigate is directly opposite this claim and if further problems stand in the way I will be forced to seek leave to have all parties reinstated in the Federal action instantly, including now Wilton RE.    

Finally, from reviewing the production materials in the lawsuit, it appears that certain carrier files may have been tampered with by an insider, who Plaintiffs have claimed was willing to pay an insurance claim without any proper beneficiary documentation and we are also looking to find who this party is.

Thank you for your cooperation in these matters and please feel free to contact me with any questions or further information.  Eliot

Eliot I. Bernstein"

Attached the Letter were These Two Documents

So Heritage Union Life Insurance Company is very aware of what is going on in this case. What will they do, if anything, is yet a mystery.

Originally Posted At

Don Sanders, assistant VP - Jackson National Life Insurance, sure seems to think it is ok to NOT investigate fraud, possible murder, forged documents signed by the deceased, and all manner of illegal activity. No Problem, here is a check. See as Pam Simon says, we are a "friendly carrier".

Don Sanders, Manfield Texas Sworn Witness Affidavit, Speaking for Jackson National.

Who is the "Owner", the "insured"? Where is the Policy? How come there is a policy number and no policy? Paid on death? Even if there is no contract, no policy and there is murder alleged? WOW, talk about a "friendly carrier".

"Heritage has been dismissed". You bet but WHY? Sure is not right and sure does not mean that Heritage nor Jackson nor Wilton Re are liable in this case. The policy amount could have been for alot more, maybe the insider at Jackson helped Pam and Ted commit fraud on the courts and maybe even worse. There is alot more to this then simply paying the claim and putting money in the court's registry. It is the responsibility of the insurance company to investigate as to who the beneficiary is BEFORE they sign away millions.

Don Sanders says that no one at Jackson has interest in the outcome of this case, I ALLEGE that is flat our false and these conflicts will turn up soon.

"In June 1998, Capitol Bankers was acquired by Swiss Re Life & Health America, Inc." Swiss is where Chris Stroup now of Wilton Re, "held the position of chief executive officer. Prior to joining Swiss Re, Mr. Stroup was a partner at Ernst & Young LLP" Ernst & Young is part of the iViewit RICO claims and Patent Theft Case.

"In May of 2000, Capitol Bankers entered into a one hundred percent Coinsurance/ Administrative Reinsurance Agreement with Reassure America Life Insurance Company"

"In May 2000, one hundred percent of stock of the Capitol Bankers was sold to Annuity & Life Reassurance."

"In December of2000, Capitol Bankers changed its name to Annuity & Life Reassurance
America, Inc."

"In August 2005, Annuity & Life Reassurance America, Inc. was acquired by Wilton Re

WOW, round and round we go to the same people and place.

"In August 2008, Annuity & Life Reassurance America, Inc. changed its name to Heritage Union Life Insurance Company."

"In 2012, Jackson acquired and merged Reassure America Life Insurance Company into Jackson, and as a result, Jackson became administrator and reinsurer of the Policy."

"Since at least 2000, Jackson (and/or its predecessor Reassure America Life Insurance Company) has been in possession of the Policy records."

Really Don Sanders, are you Sure? If that's true then where is the POLICY, who is the policy owner, where are those records?

You have "personal knowledge" of the "record keeping" WOW, well then you must know where the RECORDS are?

"The Policy records do not contain an original or executed duplicate of the Policy, which 
was issued in 1982."

Oh, gee DARN there went the theory of we keep those records.

Oh that's ok, there is a "specimen policy". So another words folks, you can just have someone put a blank form in your file, one used in other policies and then say you are entitled to millions, maybe even murder the alleged policy holder and WOW Jackson National will write you a check, no questions asked, no internal investigation just DONE.

Don Sanders has NO IDEA what was in the original policy and is simply making this up based on a sample forms of what other policy holders had. Folks, that is NOT GOOD ENOUGH, and I believe it breaks the law, from the way I read it.

Does make for a good commercial though. People will now line up to buy a Jackson National / Wilton Re Insurance Policy

Folks you do know that Insurance Policy portfolios are VERY Big Business, perhaps the biggest next to bankruptcy courts. A "SAMPLE" policy paid to a Court Registry is NOT GOOD Enough Jackson National, not even a little bit.

"From my review of the records, on the date of issuance the sum insured (or death benefit)
of the Policy was $2 million."  Review of the records, REALLY? What records, who gets the money? What is going on here? This stuff is NOT legal it seems to me. You can't just generalize a policy and pay out to a mystery person, and especially with forged documents, SIGNED by the Policy Holder, after he had already died, and allegations of murder. WOW Jackson National really is a "friendly carrier" such as Pamela Simon of STP Enterprises, Inc.

Folks, come on, do you not have a sense of some fraud here? Do you not want an investigation to make sure this does not happen at Wilton Re / Jackson National again? Or do you want a run on policy holders that don't exist and writing 2 Million dollar checks?

"The Policy is a whole life, flexible premium, life insurance contract, which is a type of
policy that builds cash value as premium payments are made." WOW building since 1982 and only 2 million, I say Poppycock to that one. Then it goes down to 1.7 due to "Financial Activity from Issue", you know the mystery issue of no Policy, no Trust, no Trustee and all that ..

"55.  On or about June 5, 1992, a letter submitted on behalf of the Policy Owner informing the
Insurer that LaSalle National Trust was being appointed as successor trustee. On June
17, 1992, the Insurer acknowledged the change of ownership and designated the Policy
Owner on its records as LaSalle National Trust, N.A., as Successor Trustee. (Bates No.

56.   On or about November 27, 1995, Capitol Bankers received a "Request Letter" signed by 
LaSalle National Trust, N.A. in their capacity as Trustee, as Policy Owner, and the
Request Letter contained the following requested changes to the Policy:

(a) LaSalle National Trust, N.A. as Trustee was designated as the primary beneficiary of

(b) The Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Insurance Tmst Dated June 21, 1995 was the Policy; and designated as the contingent beneficiary. AUS-5961160-1

57.   Though the name of the Trust on the Request Letter was set forth as stated in Par. 30(b) 
above, it was apparently abbreviated upon input into the Insurer's systems as Simon 
Bernstein Ins. Trust Dated 6/21/95. (Bates No.JCK000370, JCK000372, JCK000514,
JCK000554, 599, 601).

58.   As a matter of standard policy and procedures at Jackson and as set f011h in the Policy
itself, the designation of the Owner and Beneficiary is governed by the Request Letter or 
Direction of the Owner and not by how the name of the owner or beneficiary is input by 
employees into the Insurer's systems as part of policy administration. 

59. In my experience in operations, Insurers' systems require employees to abbreviate names
of owners and/or beneficiaries at times when the names contain too many characters for
the Insurer's systems capabilities.

60.   On November 27, 1995 Capitol Bankers sent correspondence to LaSalle National Trust 
N.A., as Successor Trustee acknowledging the changes in beneficiaries as referenced in
Par. 56 above.

61. In April of 1998, LaSalle National Trust, as successor Trustee submitted a change of 
owner which designated Simon Bernstein as the Owner of the Policy. (Bates No.

62. After reviewing Jackson's records on the Policy, I can confirm on behalf of Jackson that
on the date of death of Simon Bernstein, the Owner of the Policy was Simon Bernstein, 
the primary beneficiary was designated as LaSalle National Trust, N.A. as Successor
Trustee, and the Contingent Beneficiary was designated as Simon Bernstein Irrevocable 
Insurance Trust dated June 21, 1995. (Bates No. JCK000370).

63. Capitol Bankers Life Insurance Company acknowledged receipt of the "executed 
beneficiary change" in its correspondence to the Owner of the Policy dated November 27,
1995. (JCK000372).

64. According to Jackson's records, following the death of Simon Bernstein, Heritage or
Jackson received competing claims to the death benefit proceeds. Jackson or Heritage
received claims on behalf of the Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Insurance Trust dated June
21, 1995 and a competing claim in the form of a letter from Eliot Bernstein either on his 
own behalf or on behalf of his children."

Source, Full Document and to Download

Also, I would say something is FISHY about number 57, so either Don Sanders is mistaken or part of the corruption and fraud, in my OPINION.

I think that the insurance company records reflect the contingent beneficiary to be “Simon Bernstein Trust, N.A.” and not as Don Sanders seems to have arbitrarily stated.

Though the name of the Trust on the Request Letter was set forth as stated in Par. 30(b)
above, it was apparently abbreviated upon input into the Insurer's systems as Simon
Bernstein Ins. Trust Dated 6/21/95. (Bates No.JCK000370, JCK000372, JCK000514,
JCK000554, 599, 601).:

maybe Mr. Don Sanders or the FRAUD investigators should look into that.

Originally Posted At

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