Having participated in two Section 5 investigations of Intel competitive practices; Dockets 9288 directly with FTC investigating attorney Mr. Lin, 9341 through attorney team liaisons Ms. Espeldon, Ms. Kransky and Mr. Cox, this analyst’s stated view has been that Section 5 offers an all encompassing umbrella to research, discover, validate Intel Network program and practices that harm competition and consumers. Providing broad vantage to detect and calculate the costs of Sherman and Clayton Act violations on enterprises, industries, consumers, society and Nations.
For 9341 perhaps Section 5 should not be considered an unusual first approach to research and validate antitrust claims and harms. Two decades of Intel Network concealing and misrepresenting harms and costs on competition and consumers requires a broad approach to systematically filter from superset too subset for stringent structural proofs. Pointers and proofs decomposed from a monopoly broth relied on to conceal and divert from active system, structure and economic findings, error detection and correction through three Federal investigations, that is Intel Network monopolization for too long.
Favorably Section 5 has revealed a springboard too evolve Section 2 case precedent concerning industry competitive effects claimed to cause competitor harms that may also be competition and consumer harms. Where Section 5 investigation has filled a gap in antitrust enforcement revealing a Section 1 path too hear on industry competitive claims. Claims that are industry causes within system, structure and economic proofs of competition and consumer harms under Sherman, Clayton Acts, commerce and racketeering laws. This path to remedy industry claims through Section 1 affirmative findings offers a bracket too review and evolve Section 2 case precedent for industry competitors.
Long time industry claims are worth judicial review within the bracket of established antitrust, commerce and racketeering case precedent. On this strategy the total case cannot be lost; only won. Where it’s more important than ever for Commission too actively exercise its full Congressional authority under Section 5 judicial hearing. Two decades of Intel Network concealing criminal infiltration and espionages, intended to monopolize industries and markets through corporate political multipoint manipulation of Federal, State, and inter nation authority by organized network crime cannot be left unresolved.
Anyone in DC who continues along non address of antitrust, criminal and commercial frauds should be questioned. And if incapable of doing this job for fear of what Intel Network will do to you and your family as done to mine find someone capable to do that job. Mr. Holder, Mr. Mueller, Ms. Varney please place individuals into these positions who will do the job. No more varnishing over eighteen years of a compounding misfeasance.
The FTC has shown itself hampered in monitoring, regulating, remedying Intel corporate crime network. U.S. DOJ through inaction is suspect of a similar stall out. FBI informed of Intel marketing Media Agent spy ring over a decade ago and there are still no arrests? While known industrial spies have buried themselves deeper into strategic influence positions within technology industry, media and society. One has to ask why and what’s the next step toward reorganizing Federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies for competition espionage, and cartel case effectiveness, for industry, public and nation good.
Everyone close to these case matters knows the real Intel; society damaging enabler of cross enterprise, cross profession organized network crime. Demonstrating debilitating affects on society Intel Corporate Political Network must be reformed to achieve any rational level of enterprise, industry and competition reform. Docket 9341 consent order fails to state any antitrust remedies. This analyst believes Docket 9341 consent order will be ineffective on sole address of industry commercial frauds and futile to administer from antitrust conduct left unaddressed. Apparently not to be monitored under the order?
Under 9341 consent order, provision for Intel internal monitors of the order’s provisional frameworks has been established by the FTC. However, ironically, the very act of compliance monitors identifying out of bounds anti competitive practices, and pressing Intel for correction, can be reversed too Intel’s advantage under the order. Typical of Intel style a provision within the order enables compliance monitor’s to be dismissed by Intel for monitoring anticompetitive compliance beyond the order itself. This loop hole in compliance monitoring is significant and places monitors under Intel control. And other than for compliance monitors who are Intel Network placements presents a loosing proposition for any credible monitor.
Intel Corp. Compliance Position according to Intel Source Attorney December 22, 2010
1) Boundaries of antitrust compliance obligations do not require Intel Antitrust
Compliance Committee to address outside the organization itself, a) for example monitoring internal external relations responsible for contract negotiations or sales agreements, b) addressing outside parties notice of current or ongoing antitrust and criminal violations to Intel’s attention.
2) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require policing for internal crime, including error correcting subgroup crime within organization concealing antitrust and ongoing network crime.
3) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require focus on externalities as the catalyst for fraud & concealment to propagate antitrust & network crime violations.
4) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require policing the Intel legal department, or any department, for operation of sub groups engaged in antitrust and network crime.
5) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require addressing claims of parties afflicted by Intel commercial frauds, antitrust violations including where Intel employee and contractor obstructions are designed to mask antitrust and network crime violations by internal and external co-relations.
Where Intel presents a lot of excuse’s not to regulate for antitrust compliance. And that is because Intel cannot demonstrate management consent to regulate anticompetitive conduct or organized network crime within and proximate to the enterprise.
In official response dated January 5, 2011 Intel Attorney source concludes, “The Compliance Committee of the Board of Directors formed to ensure compliance with legal obligations arising from judgments, settlement agreements, and other similar obligations. The committee is not a public clearing house and was not formed to respond to public inquires”.
“From a scientific standpoint, what counts is knowledge not talk . . . if we want to continue to talk metaphorically about things called answers, then we still do better to speak about finding the answer, than making it . . .” - Gabriel Stolzenberg, Inquiry into the Foundation of Mathematics
Academic Attorney Position on FTC v Intel Docket 9341
Some academic attorneys suggest fault in FTC Section 5 to convene an investigation to find proofs of unfair methods of industry competition and deceptive practices that may not fit judicial interpretation within the range of established consumer antitrust cases. I acknowledge the criticism and FTC should have better prepared their complaint. And stated so before the complaint was filed. That is to state specific Clayton Act and Sherman Act violations harming consumers under Anti Trust Section 5 authority in the face of Judiciary up front. At the time a Section 1 focus. Where I suggest FTC key mistake following blindly parallel actions which contain built in faults ahead of 9341 research opening up the 9288 affirmative discovery paths. All the while FTC remained surrounded within the traditional confines of an Intel invented reality of no foul driven by Intel long time network manipulation intended to keep it that way.
Noteworthy Docket 9341, similar to Docket 9288 Section 5 investigation again deflects from channel causes that are antitrust true positives, to industrial causes that may or may not fit judicial interpretation as competition and consumer antitrust harms. Plaintiff causes repositioned by media to deflect from Intel Dealer and Media Sales Agent tied channel monopolization known too harm competition and consumers. Including tactics per se condemned by the Sherman and Clayton Acts that is price fixed product routing and structured market rigging, deflected toward the litigation trap of whether industrial harms harm consumers. Where case focus is deflected in this fashion, directed away from known antitrust violations toward industry harms that might fit as competition and consumer harms, Section 5 questions are raised.
This analyst would like to propose a corporate political concern with FTC reliance on Section 5. A transparency concern that Section 5 is being used to mask competition espionage and the crime syndicates responsible for concealing them. And discovery rules which grant Intel advance notice on what evidence to destroy or alter. And while there are multiple discovery cross checks to determine if Intel has destroyed or altered evidence, wouldn’t it be more effective to obtain a warrant on pointers and proofs, raid Intel, PC Dealers and Media Sales Agents, capture suspect and supporting documents and subsequently conceal discovery focus until the refined complaint is filed and criminal prosecution paths determined.
For a RICO case confronting the largest most financially destructive inter nation cartel in the history of modern business why would there be any other way? Perhaps this is not the FTC’s fault in poking around with their Section 5 action but indicative of drag within the U.S. DOJ Antitrust and Cartel divisions not stepping up to the plaintiffs desk sooner?
And FBI, where a problem in the San Francisco Bureau has been known for over a decade where Washington including the Director himself has always been copied on the complete case investigation as it progressed. Continued inaction in the case is a telling indicator of continued dysfunctional governance.
Network manipulation of FTC Section 5 inquiry has twice now confused and misinformed academics, attorneys, influencing observers, Congress and Senate affecting working views from information withheld. Has stymied DOJ, FTC, industry plaintiff case outcomes and how many others? By Intel Network deflecting commercial harm of their tied Dealer channel toward industry claims of harm that may or may not fit judicial interpretation of competition and consumer harms. The history of Intel investigation under 9341 and 9288 Section 5 review has made government appear ineffective. "
Source of and Full Document
Intel Corp. Need to be Accountable to the United States Laws. Intel Corp. Should NOT be Above the Law. Intel Corp. is involved in an SEC Complaint over the iViewit Stolen Technology and a 13 Trillion Dollar RICO Lawsuit.
Crystal L. Cox
S.W.O.T Analysis; Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities, Threats